Words from the land of the Styx:

"Men need images. Lacking them, they invent idols. Better then to found symbolic images on realities that leads toward the source of eternal conscious, than to the mindless pit of fear."

Oracle of Amen

Destabilizing drought: A study of climatic disruptions’ influence on the Tajik civil war

Below is my research plan. I am looking for sponsors and partners. Tips and feedback also welcome to henry.wathen @ gmail.com

SUMMARY
Increasing scarcity of water and arable land in large parts of the world often coincide with unrest, civil war or even inter-state conflict. This dissertation seeks to shed light on the process of drought contributing to destabilisation in modern times, as well as how drought may drastically worsen the consequences of conflicts. The endeavour is not to seek to demonstrate that drought on its own causes conflicts, but to incorporate drought and its consequences into a holistic view of the process of destabilisation by focusing on drought’s interplay with a range of other factors. These factors include: political upheavals, interprovincal (or clan) rivalry, neighboring countries’ aspirations to impose influence as well as unclear land ownership and privatisation schemes, both of which are related to economic transition. The study will focus on Tajikstan, synthesising the findings of previous research relating to the environmental and climatic aspects of the 1992-1995 civil war, and in addition, qualitative interviews will be held with people having first-hand experience of the events leading up to the conflict as well as the war itself. Finally, comparisons will be made with other conflicts and the role of drought in those.

HYPOTHESES
The envisaged research will seek to test to what extent drought contributed to the Tajik civil war by making water and arable land sought after commodities, thus triggering disputes over these. Furthermore, the study will assess the degree to which the droughts and floods preceeding the Tajik civil war had generated flows of internally displaced people and the extent and nature of impact these population movements had on the situation in the young republic.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC
The study follows the general framework outlined by Leif Ohlsson in Livelihood Conflicts: Linking poverty and environment as causes of conflict, here modified to the Tajik circumstances. Ohlsson’s thesis that the loss of livelihoods may set the stage for armed conflict is the center piece in the case that this dissertation seeks to test. Other studies on the above mentioned theme, mainly concerning conflicts in Africa will also be consulted as references. These include the works of the anthropologist Paul Goldsmith, Ashok Swain of Uppsala University, UNEP and UNDP reports as well as the work done at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) by Nils Petter Gleditsch and Henrik Urdal inter alia.

SOURCES AND METHODS
This study will initially survey a broad array of research and accounts of the civil war in Tajikstan, highlighting indicators of ecological/climatic impact of the sort described above, even when as in the vast majority of works on the conflict, these factors are far from the center of the authors’ focus. Russian sources will be used, but cautiously, as Yeltsin’s Russia was actively involved in the conflict. The completed collection of mostly peripheral comments by past observers and researchers on drought’s destabilizing role in the run-up to the conflict and its role in worsening the war’s impact will form the base for the study.
Added to this will be qualitative interviews with the purpose of gauging the perceptions of those affected by the conflict on the impact of drought in the destabilization of Tajikstan, in order to determine if the people “on the ground” place more importance to drought in the destabilization of Tajikstan than what has been conveyed by academics, journalists and other observers.

RELEVANCE FOR RESEARCH
The now substantial number of climatologists asserting that earth’s carbondioxide level, temperature and precipitation pattern are currently undergoing significant changes is cause for concern. Disruptions in the precipitation pattern often mean drought in one end of an oscillation area and floods in the other. (The best example of an oscillation area with vast impact on the world’s precipitation pattern is the Southern Pacific, where the peaks are known as el Niňo and la Niňa). If the frequency and magnitude of these occurences are increasing, societal consequences loom. Weak states can slide further down the destabilization spiral and in areas already affected by conflict, the consequences of these may be fuelled, as stated above. To this day, the link between climate and armed conflict remains an understudied topic, although this has begun to change.

Tajikstan has banned headscarves in public schools...

Restricting freedom of religious expression is never a good idea and let's ponder upon possible reactions and consequences. First of all, the measure risks alienating devout muslims and adding to fragmentation of society. Certainly, we didn't see adverse consequences of France's ban on religious symbols in the education sphere, (the riots don't seem to be linked to this) but Tajikstan is not France. Bordering Afghanistan and recently troubled Uzbeikstan, coupled with Tajikstans indigenous delicate balancing of Islam and secularism illustrates the country's fragile predicament. The civil war is far from forgotten and many of the fighters are still unemployed.

Quote of the day

I apologize for lying to you..... I promise not to deceive you, except in matters of this sort./Spiro T. Agnew

Morot, piska och budskap i världspolitiken

Politiska, militära, konventionella och okonventionella medel har sedan antiken brukats i noll-summespel mellan härskare. Mycket har dock förändrats i omständigheterna runt krig, diplomati, kupper och maktkamp. I det informationsgenomsyrade globala samhället ligger tonvikten i realpolitik mer på information och opinionsbildande än på konventionella vapen.
I Johannes Wahlströms artiklar i Stockholms Fria Tidning (http://www.stockholmsfria.nu/artikel/4056)och Ordfront (http://www.ordfront.se/Ordfrontmagasin/Artiklar/Ukraina.aspx) belystes Västs inblandning i den oranga revolutionen i Ukraina. De stora media däremot fokuserade på den i och för sig häpnadsväckande förgiftningen av Jusjtjenko och pro-Moskva lägrets manipulationer. Ämnet manipulation är alltjämt högaktuellt från Caracas till Kirgisien och sällan är det bara en aktör med fingrarna i syltburken.

Clintons fredsmäklare Richard Holbroke, talade senast han var i Sverige om lärdomarna från 90-talets internationella insatser på västra Balkanhalvön. Han använde det vanliga uttrycket ”piska och morot” om de medel man brukade. (Intressant nog har den amerikanska örnen ett knippe pilar mellan klorna på ena sidan och en olivkvist mellan de andra.) Nyligen talade jag med en högt uppsatt engelsk diplomat ansvarig för Albanien. Denne betonade mer nödvändigheten för det internationella samfundet att använda moroten som piska. Ett exempel på detta är kanske hur USA fick Serbien att utelämna Milosevic genom att hota med att strypa biståndet, eller rysk bestraffning av Georgien och Ukraina med högre pris på naturgas. Morotens klassiska tillämpning däremot användes effektivt 2001 när CIA-män reste runt i Afghanistan med väskor fulla av pengar och köpte krigsherrars lojalitet, sägs det. Afghanistan skiljer sig dock från Balkanländerna i den mån att landet är så underutvecklat, därmed användes realpolitikens redskap på klassiskt vis. Svensk militär personal i Afghanistan har under de senaste månaderna funnit isolerade bergsbyar där befolkningen fortfarande trott att Sovjetunionen ockuperade landet. I andra fall, i samhällen där befolkningen överskyls av information är den amerikanska örnens mäktigaste vapen varken pilarna eller olivkvisten; den amerikanske örnen vinner därför att den skriker högst och överröstar alla andra. Se bara på NATO:s presskonferenser vid upptakten till Kosovokriget, vilka grovt överdrev antalet flyktingar och döda. Sanningen om NATO:s desinformation uppdagades visserligen, men då hade nyhetsvärdet försvunnit och få lyssnade. (http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=572&a=231339&previousRenderType=2)

Hur som helst så är de mellanstatliga konflikter jag nämnt del av en krympande kategori. Mer vanliga idag är inbördeskrig och intern maktkamp, om än nästan alltid med någon form av utländsk inblandning. Denna tendens blev tydlig i och med kalla krigets vänsterregimer med högergerrilor och vice versa. Då liksom nu var örnens skrik präglade av västs synsätt vad gäller demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter och marknadsekonomi (även om det mest var det sistnämnda elementet i ideologin som i praktiken eftersträvades). Men så skedde Västvärldens storartade seger; murens fall och sammetsrevolutionerna som sedan blev modeller för dagens maktkamper. Krasst generaliserande kan man konstatera att Radio Free Europe hade mer inflytande på murens fall än Pershing II-missilerna. Moroten fanns där också i form av förhoppningar av ett bättre liv hos både folkdjup och elit. (Med facit i hand ser vi dock att det bara var eliten som fick sin morot). Visst kan man också hävda att Västvärldens seger var ideologisk, och när då ett budskap segrar så är det genom information och kommunikation.

På Balkanhalvön umgicks jag med en amerikansk West Point-utexaminerad, nu civilanställd hos NATO, som arbetade med ”info ops” (informationsoperationer). I jämförelse med sitt förflutna i infanteriet beskrev han sitt nuvarande jobb som ”samma sak men i andra änden av maskineriet”. ”Psy ops”, psykologisk krigföring var en central del av hans sysselsättning, som han undvek att beskriva i detalj. Klart framstod dock att det handlade om att påverka opinionsblidning. Jag träffade under de sista två åren också en lång rad balkanpolitiker. Bläddrandes i min anteckningsbok blir jag varse om att ”manipulation” hör till de mest förekommande orden, vilket även känns väldigt bekant från mina tidigare möten med politiker från före detta Sovjetunionen. Hur många gånger fick jag inte höra att den och den journalisten, politikern, rebellen eller gangstern var ett verktyg för parti X eller stormakt Y. Alla sådana anklagelser bör tas med en nypa salt, men mycket tyder ändå på att just manipulering är det främsta medlet i dagens realpolitik. Individer manipuleras med pengar eller utpressning och folket manipuleras med propaganda. Detta för kanske tankarna till den kända liknelsen med marionetter som kontrolleras av dolda mästare, men verkligheten liknar mer glöd som blåses på såväl öppet som dolt.

I många länder där det glöder idag har media och det civila samhället nyckelroller. Självklart finns där också diplomater och eller agenter som agerar för sitt lands upplevda intressen. De suddiga gränserna mellan alla dessa aktörer ger bränsle till konspirationsteorier, vilka i sig ofta nyttjas i propagandan. Den välkände judiske informatonsmogulen George Soros maktposition ger näring åt klassisk antisemitism. Soros fotfolk är för övrigt inte längre välkomna i Uzbekistan, amerikanska militären likaså. 29 juli deklarerade uzbekiska utrikesdepartementet att amerikanerna hade 180 dagar på sig att förflytta sina soldater och flygplan från uzbekiskt territorium. I vårt närområde är Polen aktivt i Vitryssland genom stöd till oppositionella och till Vitrysslands polska minoritet. Lukasjenkos senaste motdrag var att förbjuda utländskt bistånd till politiska aktiviteter.

Vi får också se vad som händer i Azerbajdzjan som går till val i november. En rörelse vid namn ”Yeni Fikir” (Nytänkande) har bildats efter georgisk och ukrainsk modell. Det blev kännt den 4 augusti att dess ledare Ruslan Bashirli blivit arresterad och myndigheterna anklagar honom, såväl som amerikanska National Democratic Institute (NDI) och ärkefienden Armeniens säkerhetstjänst för inblandning i ett försök till olagligt regimskifte. NDI leds av ingen annan än Madeleine Albright. Myndigheterna går hårt fram i sin kontrarevolutionära iver, orangea plagg beslagtas i Bakus butiker rapporterade www.mosnews.com 19 augusti (http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/08/19/orangenon.shtml).

I Ryssland har president Putin ända sedan år 2000 gradvis stärkt kontrollen över media. Nu har han även börjat koppla ett (judo)grepp om det civila samhället. Senast väckte han stor oro när han kritiserade utländsk finansiering av det civila samhällets aktörer. Även intressant i relation till detta tema är att Putins sympatisörer har startat en ”patriotisk och antifascistisk” ungdomsorganisation vid namn ”Nasji” (De Våra). Företeelsen är klart och tydligt regimens reaktion till revolutionerna i Georgien, Ukraina och Kirgisien. Dessa ungdomar skall stoppa de orangea i Ryssland. Under denna sommar har tusentals av dem skolats i retorik, politik och andra färdigheter varvat med idrottsaktiviteter vid ett flertal läger. Företeelsen är inte helt ny, utan snarare en ny Komsomol anpassad till 2000-talet.

Det skulle vara fördelaktigt om konflikter mer skulle utkämpas med hjälp av ökad information, muntlig argumentation och förhandling och vapnens roll minskades. Vi är tyvärr långt därifrån idag. Kontrollen över information och opinionsbildande kan tyvärr utnyttjas i negativa och farliga syften. Se bara på hatradioprogrammen som manade till folkmord i Rwanda 1994. Man bör inte heller vara blind för manipulation även bland oss stabila EU-medborgare. Många oroades ju över Berlusconis kontroll över den italienska mediamarknaden.

Only diplomacy can save Iraq

(The article below is the English language version of my op-ed piece in Helsinki’s Hufvudstadsbladet published 1 June 2005.)

The US should bear in mind the words of the ancient Chinese martial philosopher Sun Tzu:
“When a general is morally weak and his authority has lost its rigor, when his orders and directives lack wisdom, then his army becomes disoriented, and chaos is born”

Two years after toppling Saddam Hussein, the US, Britain and the dwindling coalition of the willing have still failed to establish law and order in Iraq. A new approach is needed and other actors need to step in. Otherwise, the death-dealing violence in that country will continue to threaten stability in the region and fuel more anti-Western terrorism worldwide.
Admittedly, there is no simple solution to the complex problems of post-Saddam Iraq, where a multitude of domestic political actors as well as external forces hold high stakes. But no solution at all will be possible unless certain major mistakes are corrected. One of these was that the January elections failed to include the Sunni minority in the process of democratization. Another was the Bush rhetoric about the axis of evil and other pressure on Iran and Syria, which denied these countries the chance of mantling any official role in the crisis in their own neighborhood. More is needed, though, than just correcting past mistakes. A shift of paradigm is essential, from unilateral force to inclusive dialogue. Military action by itself will not restore order in Iraq; instead, the emphasis should be on generating a true peace process. The root causes of the bloody resistance are not being addressed, and by continuing to pound Iraqi towns, kicking in doors and firing liberally in all directions, the US and its allies will only further inflame the hostility of the Iraqis.
As long as Iraq is a failed state, terrorist groups will be able to set up bases there, training and preparing for missions in other areas. Saudi Arabia, which already has a growing problem with Islamist terrorists, may be experiencing spillover from Iraq. Syria, too, may eventually suffer from tolerating the activities of the Iraqi resistance on their soil. For domestic political reasons, Assad did not dare to strike against the flow of arms and people to these groups. But just as the PLO grew into a state within a state in both Lebanon and Jordan, the Iraqi groups may eventually threaten stability in Syria. In addition to these local effects, a continuing jihad in Iraq will likely inspire extremists to strike again against the US and its allies.
Several commentators have attempted to portray what has been happening in the Middle East as evidence of a successful US foreign policy, citing the ousting of the Syrians from Lebanon, Egyptian president Mubarak's allowing competition on the presidential ballot, Palestinian elections and limited Saudi local elections (for men only) as signs of a wind of change. Some go so far as to compare these developments with the toppling of the Berlin Wall. But in contrast to these rosy analyses, Lebanon has experienced a string of bombings, and Islamist candidates won the elections in Saudi Arabia. The optimists and neo-conservatives encouraging a democratic crusade in the Middle East also fail to mention the mounting Shiite insurgency in Yemen and PKK's return to arms in Turkey; both of these developments followed Operation Iraqi Freedom. When claiming a casual link between the invasion of Iraq and democratic currents one can just as well link all negative events to Bush and Blair's assertiveness. The comparison with glasnost and the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe is also interesting. Though such sweeping generalizations are usually ridden with fallacies, again there are similarities. Gorbachev's perestroika not only brought democracy to Eastern Europe, but also generated brutal conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, regions which have more in common with the Middle East than does Eastern Europe.
In view of these sobering facts, what should be the essential elements of a new policy toward Iraq? First, the perception of the coalition forces as occupants in that country is a clear indication that the US, Britain and other coalition members should immediately set a reasonably early date for withdrawal and thereafter limit their role in Iraq to diplomacy and development aid. Given the inadequacy of Iraq's own security forces, however, external military assistance is clearly needed. A new force must be put together, and it must be unambiguously identifiable as separate from the current occupants. With a mandate from the UN Security Council, a force led by Jordan, Morocco or Egypt could be assembled under the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League. However, as the countries of the Middle East have proven largely incapable of concerted diplomatic action, the US should remain involved, though with a low profile. Pakistan and Bangladesh, with their extensive experience in peacekeeping, could augment the military force, while the EU could provide military advisers and staff officers, and perhaps special-operations units, from countries opposed to the war such as France, Germany and Sweden. Also, Canada may play a constructive role. For practical purposes the new force would probably need US logistical support, in airlifts for example. Positive steps toward multilateralization have already been taken. NATO is training Iraqi security forces (though not on Iraqi soil), and the EU has established its rule-of-law mission in Iraq, EUJUST LEX as well as ECHO, the European Commission Humanitarian Office’s programmes in Iraq.
The transition to the new force should be part of an integrated approach to securing peace in Iraq. For instance, further resources are needed for supplying electricity, clean water and constructing sewage systems, and the "hearts and minds" policy should be tempered with an amnesty for resistance fighters not guilty of war crimes ( i.e. striking at civilian targets), as proposed by President Jalal Talabani when sworn in on 7 April. Similarly, the US and Britain must set an example in dealing with their own offenders. The demotion of Brigadier General Karpinski, formerly in charge of Abu Ghraib, is a good start, but the US must not stop there if it is to have any hope of regaining respect worldwide.
Importantly, a real peace process cannot exclude Iran, which intends to play an active role in post-Saddam Iraq. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, recently corroborated by Time magazine, Iran's influence in Iraq is considerable, especially in the Shiite community, but also in the Kurdish north. Iran is justified in intervening as long as the Mujaheedin Khalq Organization is fighting the regime in Teheran from bases in Iraq. This group should be demobilized, and Teheran should receive guarantees that no similar group be allowed to operate from Iraqi territory.
Turkey has similar concerns with the PKK, which is based in northern Iraq, and the Turkish army will continue their occasional incursions into Iraq as long as this situation persists. Surely, the Kurds will demand a quid pro quo for demobilizing PKK, but ignoring this situation is not an option -- Iraq will never be stable as long as it keeps hosting rebel groups from its neighbors. It may seem naive to argue that US should withdraw from Iraq and limit itself to behind-the-scenes diplomacy while relying on Middle Eastern countries and other actors to provide security. But together with regional discord, US overzealousness is perhaps the principal cause of the instability in Iraq and neighboring countries. Peace in Iraq is not possible unless both these factors are addressed.