Saturday, September 16, 2006

Urbana livsnjutare röstar "Ja" till trängselskatt

Tänk efter nu precis hur du vill ha det när du sitter på utecafé, sörplar på en dubbel espresso, läser "Under strecket" eller DN Kultur och väntar på en bekant du inte träffat på länge. Självklart vill man att förbipasserande bilar skall hållas till ett minimum.

För ett flanervänligt, behagligt, angenämnt och njutbart Stockholm - Rösta "Ja"!

Monday, September 11, 2006

SPIRITUAL FEMINISM REVISITED - THE PEACOCK FEATHER: SIX STORIES FOR SIX NIGHTS, BY LJILJANA HABJANOVIC DJUROVICH

Many consider progress has been made in female empowerment now that women are in the work force and even reach high positions in male dominated spheres. Yet, the entertainment sector has become highly siliconized and sexual harrasment is commonplace at schools. I acknowledge some positive developments, but the missing link in today's feminism, I argue, is the sacredness of fertility. Dan Brown touched upon the subject in "The Da Vinci Code", but a much more powerful mouthpiece for spiritual feminism is of course a woman; Ljiljana Habjanovich Djurovich. "The Peacock Feather" can be considered a modern addendum to the gnostic gospel.

However, the author/prophet displays her affection and glorification of the Proto-Slavs with statements such as:

"They [the Slavs] conquered foreign territories and lost everything on them. Divided into many tribes they scattered all over Europe like a broken necklace. They mixed their blood and language with other peoples. They learned to lie and to hate, and to be treacherous."

Still the mythical idealization of the author's ancestors is a minor element in "The Peacock Feather", much more dominant is the weaving together of the Bible, Greek, Egyptian, Hindu, Slavic and Persian myths and symbolism. The thread throughout the six stories is woman herself and the eye that looks upon the reader from the peacock feather. At the same time it is a call against dogmatism; on the last page Mary says:

"My son wanted people to understand God better. And he wanted to teach them that God was not addressed or served by merely sticking to the strict rules, but by true love."

Published by: Narodna Knjiga, Belgrade 2000

On the topic of Peacocks it is interesting to note that the central figure in the Yezidis' faith is Melek-Taus, the peacock angel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melek_Taus)

Saturday, April 22, 2006

Some thought on our Scandinavian (or Western) individualism

At Ikea a sign read ”Being single has both advantages and disadvantages, but the situation at home is definitely one of the advantages. My cottage has traces of everything in my personality and I enjoy the garden, cooking and spending hours reading without being disturbed. Yet at the same time the rest of the world is just a phone call away.”

It makes you think. More and more people in our part of the world live by themselves now. Once we lived in big families, grandparents, aunts, uncles and children all together. These days care of the elderly and children is institutionalized and Scandinavia, the supposed model societies, lead the world in this regard. Our social organization is developing in a pattern of entropy. Early on we teach our children their individual responsibility and the lyrics we listen to have for many generations emphasized the individual. Remember Frank Sinatra’s “I did it my way” our Jon Bon Jovi’s “It’s my life.” On the subject of lyrics, also worth pondering upon is the message of Twisted Sister’s “We’re not gonna take it” and Madonna’s “Papa don’t preach” – rebellion against parents. By no means do I want to hold these musicians responsible for the atomization of our families and the diminishing respect for age, but they are indicators of the trends in society. And certainly western individualism has deeper roots, many say in the Renaissance and secularization.

Then maybe someone considers the rise of the individual from the chains of patriarchal oppression as a positive development and not related to suicides and the growing phenomena of stress, “burning out” and depression. My answer is, widen the perspective to the evolutionary level; how do you think we are biologically fitted to live, alone or in a flock?

Milan Kundera wrote in “The Unbearable lightness of being” about the temptation to be independent as it is seemingly easier to stand alone without burdensome relations and Camus’ “Stranger” was untouched by the death of his own mother, but angst is omnipotent in these works. Also, recall the empty conversations in Ingmar Bergman’s movies between people which one would think should be close. Many have realized that what has happened in our society is anything but positive. But in the end I am optimistic as our countries are seeing a great influx of immigrants from the East and South, from countries less affected by individualism. Hence, I am convinced we must open the gates to our so-called welfare states widely. That Kurdish janitor that cleans your office is here to save you, and you should learn from him.

Tuesday, March 14, 2006

Är Islam en krigisk religion som skall bemötas med demokratiska korståg? – Några reflektioner

(Den oklippta versionen av min debattartikel i Hufvudstadsbladet 19 Maj 2005)

När jag bodde i Azerbajdzjans huvudstad Baku hösten 1997, njöt jag av att höra en grannkvinna sjunga böner den 19:de varje månad. (Hennes man hade avlidit den 19:de fick jag förklarat för mig). Jag gick ut på gatan för att höra bättre. Arabiska med azerisk accent är len och harmonisk, och hennes toner uttryckte vemod och ångest, men kanske fanns där förhopningen att deras själar skulle återförenas i nästa liv. Hur som helst så fann jag hennes böner spirituellt upplyftande, likaså tilltalades min själ av böneutropen från minareterna. Sista dagen i Baku gick jag runt på stan med Emil, en av sönerna i min värdfamilj. De bodde för övrigt i Bakus gamla stadskärna, omgärdad av en mur från 1300-talet, med slingrande gränder och ett dussintal moskéer, den äldsta från 1200-talet. Vi gick förbi en av de andra moskéerna vid bönetiden. Jag stannade till när jag hörde det långa utdragna ”Allaaahu akbar” och tårarna flödade ner längs mina kinder. Ja, så mycket älskar jag självmordsbombarnas religion.
Min religionsprofessor på Marlboro College i Vermont, Baptistpastorn James E. Thomas menade att det är missledande att tala om en Islam, när det i själva verket finns en hel uppsjö av tolkningar och versioner. Skönheten må vara överväldigande, men alltjämt finns där krigiska element i flera av de utbredda tolkningarna. I en annan del av världen mötte jag en Mufti (motsvarar ungefär biskop) som drog fram sin pistol när jag satt på hans kontor, för att ge eftertryck åt sitt krav på att polisen skulle dra tillbaka sina vägspärrar från hans distrikt. Likaså förnekade han inte sitt förflutna i landets gerrilla.
Korståg, folkmord och tvångskonverteringar (inte minst av samer och finnar) må svärta västerlandets historia, men i 2000-talets annars så galna värld är våld i Jesu namn en tämligen marginell företeelse. Frestande är det kanske att jämföra Muhammed och Jesus gärningar, där den förste lade grunden för ett imperium medan den senare framställs mer som att ha lett en misslyckad civil olydnadskampanj (som ju i och för sig bar frukt tre århundraden senare när Romarriket accepterade Kristendomen). Och så judarna, efter årtusenden av förtryck skapar de en apartheidstat som bedriver aktiv expansionism motiverat med de heliga skrifterna, är de mindre krigiska? Nåväl, ingen blir klokare av att dra sådana generaliseringar det är i princip lika hopplöst som att diskutera om Muhammed var pedofil eller inte (den debatt som pågått i Sverige på sistone).
Välkänt är dock att Islam används som ideologi för Al-Qaida, talibanerna och irakiska motståndet. Till en viss utsträckning användes religion även i retoriken från Saddam Husseins från början sekulära regim. När man dock (stödda av USA) låg i krig med shi’itiska Iran fann Hussein det lämpligt att lägga till orden Allahu Akbar på nationens flagga. När man sedan fann sig i konflikt med USA och dess kristna allierade fick Islam en större roll i regimens utspel. Saddams medier basunerade ut under de sista åren att han skrivit en Koran i sitt eget blod. Men baathregimens Irak hann aldrig bli mer islamistiskt än vad Bush den yngres USA är Krist-fundamentalistiskt. Bushs stöd från den kristna högern var instrumentalt i hans seger 2000, mycket tack vare att han offentligt deklarerade sig som en evangelisk Kristen. Dock har kristendomen endast en subtil roll i i Bushs motivation till kriget. De angivna skälen att Irak hade eller var på väg att skaffa massförstörelsevapen och var delaktigt i 11 september attackerna har redan belysts (och knäckts) i media, men där finns faktiskt element av korståg, om än ej i Guds men i demokratins namn, med syftet att sprida demokrati med vapens hjälp. Jag tar upp detta för att avrunda min argumentation om Islams roll i krigisk retorik, därför att min uppfattning är inte att utövarna av islam är mer krigiska än kristna. Det faktum att islam oftare än kristendomen idag avänds för att motivera krig beror snarare på att de kristna länderna är mer sekulariserade. Men för att förstå krigets retorik i väst anser jag att man bör överge den snävt definerade termen religion och istället tala om värderings- och trosystem. Vi i väst är ju lika övertygade om demokratins rättfärdighet som talibanerna är (ja de finns kvar) att mullorna skall styra. Mellanöstern kommer knappast bli fredligare och rättvisare av fler angreppskrig i demokratins namn. Kanske bör man istället närmare studera och kanske låna delar av den iranska modellen av kombinerad teokrati och demokrati, även om den förstnämnda är alltför dominant (uppenbart efter President Khatamis misslyckade försök till perestrojka) för att systemet i sin helhet skall falla oss västerlänningar i smaken. Som djupt övertygad om än ej konfirmerad demokrat vill jag argumentera för att folken i Mellanöstern skall få forma sin egen politiska framtid och vi måste alla lämna de dominerande tankegångarna om civilisationernas kamp.

Friday, February 03, 2006

Champions of chauvinism join the security apparatus

While the colonization of America gave birth to the mythical cowboy, the Russian Empire’s closest equivalent are the Cossacks. Starting as loose bands which for various reasons settled in the periphery of the Empire, they developed into military units and outpost communities. As they largely sided with the Whites in the revolution they were persecuted by the Soviet regime, but were reinstated during the Yeltsin years to augment law enforcement as well as border guards. However, as times have changed, the new Cossacks have adapted to the realities of post-Soviet Russia and have become opaque but influential entities with tentacles stretching into business as well as politics. During the nineties the Don and Kuban Cossacks became infamous for participating as volunteers in a number of conflicts, including Bosnia, Trans-Dniestr(1) and Abkhazia.(2) Most importantly, racism against indigenous Caucasians, the historical arch-enemies of the Cossacks, radiate through the mafia-like structure(3) of contemporary Cossacks, yet the Kremlin has now by law incorporated the Cossacks in the security structures.

Krasnodar (Kuban Cossacks) – Harassing non-Russians and non-Orthodox
Meshkhetian Turks having resettled from Krasnodar to Tucson, Arizona, claim having been harassed by Cossacks. "If we grow our own vegetables or food, we could not sell them. . . The Cossacks had their own stores and would not let us sell," Akhmed Aslanov, one of the refugees, told a reporter from the Tucson Citizen.(4) The Washington Post revealed that, Aslanov is only one of 5 000 Meskhetian Turks who have resettled in the US this past year as the Cossacks are spearheading a campaign of “soft ethnic cleansing,” according to Alexander Osipov, an analyst at the Institute for Humanities and Political Studies in Moscow. In the same article, Sarvar Tedorov, a community leader from Varenikovskaya states; “How can Putin make police out of people who have no respect for the law?. . . Is he completely blind? They break into our houses, even during prayer. They humiliate us and call us names. The beatings are regular.”(5) Recent reports also indicate Cossacks have threatened British journalists attempting to document the plight of the Meshkhetian Turks(6) as well as the local Hare Krishna.(7) A Yerevan paper reported that Armenians in the Krasnodar territory also are targeted by the Cossacks and that the actions are encouraged by local authorities.(8)


Rostov (Don Cossacks) – Hand in hand with the authorities
The leader of the Don Cossacks, Viktor Vodolatski, also serves as Vice Governor of Rostov oblast and stated in August that his Cossacks could restore order and “quickly teach the new arrivals” how to behave. When a group of Chechens reportedly raped the daughter of the Cossack leader in Remontnoye, Vodolatski mustered some 500 Cossacks who converged on the village but were blocked by nearly a thousand Russian Interior Ministry troops. Although, subsequently the Interior Ministry’s special unit OMON began to conduct joint patrols with the Cossacks in Remontnoye, searching the residences of non-Russian arrivals from the northern Caucasus for contraband and checking their documentation in order to determine whether any of them were there illegally and thus, allegedly, constituted a threat to the residents of this village.(9) Interestingly, there exists a group of unregistered Don Cossacks, led by Nikolai Kositsyn, rivals to Vodolatski’s recognized organization.(10)

Crimea – Confronting the Tatars
In coastal Crimea which is subject to a large number of property conflicts, some of these have ethnic connotations. Opposing the Crimean Tatars having returned from deportation are also groups calling themselves Cossacks, although the reporter of RFE/RL meeting some of them in Feodosia last year concluded they “look like skinheads”. In that case the stand-off between Cossacks and Tatars was over the latters’ plans to build a cultural centre on disputed land, but an argument raised by the Cossacks was the Crimean Tatars’ supposed separatist agenda and links to Muslim fundamentalists. RFE/RL also learned that most of the Cossacks camping out at the disputed beach property were not Ukrainian Cossacks, but from Krasnodar and Rostov.(11)

Mobilization in local politics
One oddity in the otherwise highly predictable recent local elections shows that the Cossacks are not always obedient henchmen of the authorities. Their grass-roots support makes them a force of their own to reckon with, whose agenda might not always be in line with that of Kremlin’s favourites. In the village of Azovskaya, outside Krasnodar, Igor Vasyuta the incumbent and protegé of the regional authority was defeated by Aleksey Podobny the candidate of the local Cossacks with more than a 20 per cent margin.(12) Also in other areas Cossack representatives were elected to local government, the Okrug of Ust’-Medvednitski in the Volgograd saw 40 Cossacks elected for office. The words of the deputy head of Volgograd’s provincial administration Jurij Sizov, that the Cossacks are capable of both stabilizing the situation in the south of Russia as well as coming to the defence of her borders indicate good relations between Cossacks and local power in that area.(13)

Formalizing their status
Now commonplace vigilantes and informal reinforcements to the police, the Cossacks are in the process of being incorporated into the regular law enforcement and security apparatus. Putin in April submitted a bill to the State Duma that would allow Cossacks to serve as soldiers, police, and border guards. The bill passed the Duma on 9 November and was published in Rossiskaya Gazeta a month later. The law stipulates Cossacks will serve with the Ministry of Interior as well as border guards, taking part in upholding public order, dealing with environmental hazards, fires and terrorism.(14) In a press conference on 15 December, Vodolatski went further, claiming that partial responsibility for securing borders and enforcing customs would through agreements be transferred to the Cossacks.(15)

Words of warning
Osipov (aforementioned analyst) warned against the measure; “Who enters Cossack organizations? Former - or even serving - police officers, former army officers, or simply losers, collective-farm members who tend to drink too much vodka. On the whole, people with nationalist, archaic views.”(18) In a similar vein, Aleksandr Golts, a military expert and deputy editor of Yezhednevnyi Zhurnal, asserts that “. . . we have a lot of examples of them organizing something like lynch-courts.”(17) The elements described in this manner have been elevated to a place of honor as Putin’s presidential guard now includes two squadrons of Cossack cavalry. Moreover, Edgar Saroyan, a correspondent with the RIA-Novosti news agency in the Northern Caucasus warns that arming the Cossacks would further destabilize the North Caucasus.(18) Alarming is perhaps the paragraph of the law that specifically mentions that the Cossacks should be enlisted in the fight against terrorism.(19) Lessons learned from other places in the world indicate this could bode ill for the already shaky respect of human rights in Russia.

Notes
1. Grau, Lester W. “The Cossack Brotherhood Reborn: A Political/military Force in a Realm of Chaos” The Foreign Military Studies Office; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/cossack/cossack.htm#68, originally published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 1993.
2. Gordienko, Anatolij. “Abkhaziya gotovitsya k yugoslavskomu tsenariyu” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, No 49(458), 23 December, 2005; http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2005-12-23/1_abhazia.html.
3. The description of the Cossacks as ”mafia” is that of a local source who wishes to remain anonymous.
4. Revere, C.T., “City opens arms to thankful family” Tucson Citizen, 24 November, 2005; http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/intucson/history_culture/112405a1_ct_thanksgiving.
5. Finn, Peter, “Revival of Cossacks Casts Muslim Group Out of Russia to U.S.” Washington Post Foreign Service, 18 November, 2005; Page A19 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702014.html.
6. “British Journalists Get Personal Lesson in Cossack Intimidation Tactics” FSU Monitor, 6 October, 2005; http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/100605Russ2.shtml.
7. ”Orthodox Activists, Cossacks Attack Hindu Festival in South Russia” MosNews, 6 October, 2005; http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/10/06/krishnabeaten.shtml.
8. Ria Novosti, 29 April, 2005; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050429/39761709.html citing Aikakan Zhamanak, 21 April, 2005.
9. Goble, Paul, “Window on Eurasia: Will Russia’s Cossacks Again Repress Non-Russian Minorities?” FSU Monitor, 10 August, 2005; http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/081005Russia.shtml.
10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 186, Part I, 3 October, 2005.
11. Krushelnycky, Askold. “Ukraine: Crimea's Tatars -- Uneasy Relations With Russian Cossacks” RFE/RL, 27 August 2004; http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/08/a2fee1cf-b0f6-41b6-9065-ea7f757374e1.html.
12. Reported by the local opposition paper Novaya Gazeta Kubani, No. 1119(94), 15 December, 2005; http://pressa.kuban.info/article/ngk/26375/.
13. “Kazaki idut vo vlast’” Volgograd v Seti 25 January, 2006; http://www.volgograd.ru/news/?new=28725.
14. Federalnyj zakon Rossiskoj Federatsii ot 5 dekabrya 2005 g. N 154-Ф3 “O gosudarstvennoj sluzjbye rossiskogo kazachestvo”; http://www.rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html.
15. “Viktor Volodatskij: Deyatelnost kazachestvo v Rossii uzakonena” IA Regnum, 16 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/561508.html.
16. Bigg, Claire, “Russia: Putin Takes Steps To Help Cossacks Restore Some Of Their Former Status” RFE/RL, 27 May, 2005; http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/01322f73-7f51-49f5-80c9-34371343f99c.html.
17. Parsons, Robert, “Cossack Revival Gains Momentum” RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies, Vol. 6, No. 8, 18 May, 2005.
18. Ibid.
19. Article V §4.3, Federalnyj zakon Rossiskoj Federatsii ot 5 dekabrya 2005 g. N 154-Ф3 O gosudarstvennoj sluzhbye rossiskogo kazachestvo; http://www.rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html.

Thursday, January 19, 2006

North Caucasus in 2006 – Trouble behind and trouble ahead

The trend from 2004 of violence spreading from Chechnya to the greater North Caucasus region continues. Dagestan has now even passed Chechnya in number of attacks and the most significant event of the year was clearly the multiple strikes by insurgents in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria on the 13th of October. It is thus too late to speak of the conflict in Chechnya threatening to spread; in fact the Chechen conflict has already destabilized the surrounding region. The Kremlin will likely use the destabilization in the autonomous republics as a justification for strengthening vertical control over the region and weakening local self-government. The only example of actually increasing a minority’s role in local-self government was the creation of the Abazin municipality in Karachayevo-Cherkessia(1). An old strategy from Muscovy’s armory, that of co-opting a local clan and supporting their hold on power is what has been done in Chechnya with the Kadyrovs. However, Moscow does not wish the local leadership to be too strong, as the removal of Ruslan Aushev, former President of Ingushetia proved already in 2001(2), as well as the recent use of a “representative” for the south of Russia, Dmitri Kozak. A significant question for the Northwest Caucasus are the calls for splitting the artificially twinned republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia and conversely, the proposal of unifying Adygeya with Krasnodarski Krai. Separatist and irredentist tendencies may interact with other factors such as religious extremism, competition for local power as well as tension between centre and periphery in the continued spiral of destabilization.

Chechnya calmer, but conflict spilling over
The killing of Chechnya’s separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov in March has been described both as a visible success for Russian hawks, and as an obstacle for any negotiated solution, as Maskhadov was the main moderate(3). While Russia’s security forces continue to strengthen their hold on Chechnya and at least some reconstruction funds end up with the needy(4), the situation is deteriorating in Dagestan which surpassed Chechnya in number of terrorist attacks in 2005. Moreover, the news agency ANN claims the Interior Ministry does not control up to 15 per cent of Dagestan’s territory and in the same article speculates on how interwoven ethnic- clan- and political affiliations may break up the republic and cause civil war(5). Kavkazski Uzel goes further already calling the current situation in Dagestan a “low-intensity civil war”(6).

Brutality of authorities adding fuel to the fire
There are no indicators that earlier reported torture, extorting money from relatives of detainees and unjustified use of force have diminished. On the contrary, media in June exposed a brutal raid by the armed forces’ “Vostok” battalion, involving torching of houses and extrajudicial killings in the village of Borozdinovskaya, close to Chechnya’s border with Dagestan(7). One analysis concludes that the Chechenization of the conflict has led to further abuses and created a class of men dependent on the conflict to continue for their livelihood(8). Outside Chechnya last year’s tragedy in Beslan and this October’s insurgent attacks in the city of Nalchik have triggered a brutal clamp down on all devout Muslims. Police target those who go to the mosques and are said to be encouraged to make arrests in a manner much reminiscent of the Vietnam War’s infamous focus on the “body count”, according to IWPR’s correspondent in Karachai-Cherkessia. Consequences are easy to fathom, mosque goers will be pushed towards underground prayer sessions and to extremism after being humiliated by the police(9). Demonstrations in Nalchik by parents of the fighters indicate that the resistance movement is not run by outsiders such as Al-Qaeda, but relies on local support in Kabardino-Balkaria(10).

The artificial twin-nationality republics
Gordon Hahn, an independent scholar cited by Russia Profile.org claims gerrymandering in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (KBR) generates Balkar nationalism, which is linked both to Karachai nationalism as well as to Islamic extremism:

"… there is the danger that pressure on the Kabard-dominated elite to clean up government and crime would drive some into the arms of the terrorists, thereby assisting the latter in building a multiethnic pan-Muslim, pan-Caucasus, Islamist movement/network. The Balkar minority, with only 10 percent of the KBR population, as a political outsider is being driven into the terrorists’ arms by the KBR elite’s clumsy efforts to incorporate Balkar districts into Kabard-dominated ones, prompting a revival of Balkar ethno-nationalism and calls for setting up a separate Balkar Republic. The Balkar-Karachai nationalist organization Jamagat, which may be tied to a combat jamaat of the same name in Karachevo-Cherkessiya, has verbally supported terrorist attacks in the KBR on its on-again, off-again, website Camagat.com."(11)

Thus, as extremists are gaining ground in the area, the highly sensitive issue of dividing the Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia Republics could if not handled carefully ignite more violence.

Uniting Adygeya with Krasnodarski Krai
The issue has been raised to hold a referendum on unifying the Republic of Adygyea with her surrounding larger neighbour Krasnodarski Krai. On Ekho Moskvy Yuliya Latynina warned against this initiative, arguing that status quo was working well, security is not a problem in Adygeya, but swallowing the entity of the ethnic Adygeans into the Russian dominated Krasnodarski Krai would generate a nationalist back-lash and could even lead to violence. Also, she pointed out that the main propagators of the move, so-called Cossacks were more like “fascists”(12).

Conclusions
Above mentioned events and trends paint a bleak picture for the North Caucasus in 2006. Continued unrest is to expect. Much of this can be attributed to the forceful and despotic policy of the Putin administration. Central is the failure to establish rule of law, which is undermined by the Kremlin’s tendency to give local favourites free reign and laissez-faire to human rights abuses. Also, paramount to establishing good governance with checks and balances is a functioning civil society. Grass roots initiatives could do a lot of good in this region where people have long lost their trust in central authorities. However, Putin’s course this year has been specifically to hamper the work of non-governmental organizations(13). Fearing to lose some control only increases Putin’s risks of losing all control in the North Caucasus.

Notes

1. ”V Karachevo-Cherkesi obrazovan novy rayon” Gazeta.ru, 29 December, 2005; http://www.gazeta.ru/lenta/2005/12/29/news_508510.shtml and “Abazinski rayon poyavitsya na karte Karachayevo-Cherkessii” IA REGNUM, 29 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/567866.html.

2. Ware, Robert Bruce. ”In the North Caucasus All Sides Are Losing” Russia Profile.org; http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/article.wbp?article-id=C4439DC1-35E6-4660-955E-301AE6ED0046 and “An empire’s fraying edge” Economist, 12 February, 2005, p 23.

3. Mstislavskaya, Mariya. “Basayev, Maskhadov i spor o beslanskom teraktye” Lenta.ru, 30 December, 2005; http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/12/30/caucasus/.

4. “An empire’s fraying edge” Economist, 12 February, 2005, p 22.

5. ”Eksperty: Dagestan ustroyen gorazdo slozjnyeye Chechni” ANN, 28 December, 2005; http://www.annews.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25806.

6. “Dagestan: Khronika terrora (1996-2005gg)” Kavkazski Uzel, 30 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/chronics/id/790621.html.

7. ”Pravozashitniki schitayut, shto bezjentsy iz Borozdinovskoi zjivut v kriticheskikh usloviyakh” IA REGNUM, 17 November, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/546160.html and Mariya Mstislavskaya. “Basayev, Maskhadov i spor o beslanskom teraktye” Lenta.ru, 30 December, 2005; http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/12/30/caucasus/.

8. “V atmosferye strakha” MiK, 6 December 2005; http://www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=24745.

9. Gukemukhov, Murat. “Fears and Arrests in Karachai-Cherkessia” IWPR, 17 December, 2005; http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=258721&apc_state=henh.
10. ”V Nalchike demonstranty khoteli szjet chuchela glavy MVD i muftiya” IA REGNUM, 30 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/568515.html and Lyudmila Maratova. ”V Kabardino-Balkarii militsiya razognala piket roditeley pogibshikh boyevikov” Kavkazski Uzel, 30 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/913460.html.

11. Hahn, Gordon. “On the Nalchik Raid and Russia's Islamist Revolution” Russia Profile.org; http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/article.wbp?article-id=C4439DC1-35E6-4660-955E-301AE6ED0046.

12. Latynina, Yuliya. “Kod Dostupa” Ekho Moskvy, 24 December, 2005; http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/40795. The initiative has also been criticized in Azeri press, see: RIA Novosti, 30 December, 2005; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20051230/42801633.html.

13. Feraposhkin, Vyacheslav. ”Lidery grazjdanskikh organizatsi nadyeyutsya shto prezident ne podpishet zakonoproyekt, uzjestochayuschi kontrol za NKO” Kavkazski Uzel, 23 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/909060.html.