tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-153213092024-03-12T16:07:56.426-07:00Window EastHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.comBlogger23125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-72669932593750953252010-09-24T09:01:00.000-07:002010-09-24T09:03:26.382-07:00I have migrated to my new blog www.windoweast.com<br /><br />Henry WathenHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-35599094257520527612009-08-09T06:00:00.000-07:002009-08-09T06:06:05.514-07:00Vi går på gatan<br />Du från ett håll och jag från ett annat<br />Jag bestämmer en kurs för att inte kollidera<br />Jag tittar upp i ditt ansikte<br />bara av ren nyfikenhet<br />lite förläget<br />Möts våra ögon någon sekund<br />snabbt ner<br />tillbaka till marken<br />Och så går vi förbi varandra var och en till sittHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-55314386858669879882009-08-08T14:22:00.000-07:002009-08-08T14:30:42.038-07:00On the ferry from Helsinki to Stockholm, it struck me that;<br /><br /><em>Are the stars God's tears?</em><br /><em>One for each woman whose husbond loves the bottle more than he loves her</em><br /><em>One for each man who loves the bottle more than he loves his wife</em><br /><em>One for each woman who longs for a shot of heroine more than she longs for her child</em><br /><em>One for each child who sees his father beat his mother</em><br /><em>One for each regret, one for each sorrow</em><br /><em>Look up - there are many of them</em><br /><em>One for all of us</em>Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-39426764213755091472009-07-25T16:06:00.000-07:002009-07-25T16:08:08.414-07:00<strong><em>You were right and I was wrong</em></strong><br /><strong><em><br /></em></strong>In a donkeyish manner (with all respect for that species), I once argued with M that El Niňo was a storm in the Pacific a year or so ago. I should have given credit to his knowledge in the realm of natural science. I should have listened to him when he tried to explain that El Niňo was the phenomenon behind that particular storm and a fundamental facet of earth’s global precipitation pattern and atmospheric oscillation. The fishermen of South America’s Pacific coast coined the term when now and then around Christmas they would get large quantities of tropical fish in their net. It is an anomalous warming of surface water, change of predominant wind direction, linked to changes in pressure at sea level (the Southern Oscillation). It became the talk of all when meteorologists reported the links between El Niňo and weather anomalies on other places of the globe. These links are known as teleconnections, a coin termed by the Swedish meteorologist Anders Ångström. Contemporary researchers assert that global warming intensifies the El Niňo events, hence generating more weather anomalies – and extreme weather – elsewhere. Just note the headlines of droughts, floods and storms. “Earth is angry” M said.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-56239947161580643812009-07-25T15:40:00.000-07:002009-07-25T15:46:53.373-07:00<strong><em>Bulgakov and astrology</em></strong><br /><br />Russia is a dream and fate is in the stars. Bulgakov brought the devil to Moscow in <em>Master and Margarita</em>, and a thread throughout his novels is just that destiny is in the stars. The devil in disguise as the mystery man Woland announces to the poor Soviet writer Berlioz that he will be beheaded because; “Mercury in the second house, moon passed… accident…” The episode is Russian literary history; Annushka spills sunflower oil over a tram crossing. Berlioz slips, falls and is beheaded by the wheel of the tram. The determinism is coined by Woland’s phrase “Annushka has already bought the sunflower oil”.<br /><br />In Bulgakov’s other classic, the White Guard, a winter battle between white and red forces in the Ukraine is accompanied by the pulsating radiance of Mars, whom we know from Roman mythology as the god of war.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-86665822442090485732009-07-25T15:30:00.000-07:002009-07-28T06:39:49.405-07:00<strong><em>Russia I love you, eventhough you can be so cruel<br /></em></strong><br />We saw the soldiers chanting a patriotic one-liner at the change of crew at a North-Chechen check point in the movie "Blokpost". “Where there are Russians – that is Russia.” I saw the hesitant faces of young men singing along, with poorly concealed doubt to the cause they fought for. You had tears in your eyes. What did you see? – I would give a million dollars for your thoughts that moment.<br /><br />Green hills, snowcapped mountains on the horizon, but nobody there to eat the mulberries.<br /><br />A swallow’s flight away under grapevines covered with light blue pesticide Kostya lights up a Prima cigarette with the nostalgic and nationalistic but ad-free paper Zaftra (tomorrow) in front of him. “You know the world is run by jews…” he says. The United States runs the world and sionists run the US, he continues, only interrupted by a cough.<br /><br />It is Saturday so we drink “Baltika” beer and take turns in the wood stove sauna down at the dike below the corn, the potatoes, garlic, tomatoes, peppers, apples, raspberries and much more. I really enjoy the country life. Not quiet though; dogs bark, roosters call, cats fight and children play. The old sovkhoz village now lives off men working for the energy sector in Siberia. They manage quite well. The less fortunate spend their time in the relaxed state of home-made vodka. That they can afford.<br /><br />Kostya explains that in the old days everybody had jobs, lived well, there was virtually no crime and all was fine. “But you lived under a dictatorship” I replied. “Well what do we have now? Bandit capitalism, people are dying because they cannot afford their medicine. I tell you it is genocide.” Then we return to the speal about the American-sionist conspiracy which brought down the Soviet Union.<br /><br />When he merits Stalin his statesmanship I of course comment the twenty million dead we know about. “When you chop wood you get some splinters” he answers.<br /><br />Tollik comes by for his usual Saturday visit. He tells me he saw a documentary recently about the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968. He had seen it with his own eyes back then as a Red Army tank crewman. The film’s critical and questioning approach had affected him. “It made me sick”, he said. To myself I thought it adds to the credit of Russian society that such a documentary was aired and people were coming to terms with the past.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-10160785877429096432009-07-25T14:50:00.000-07:002009-07-25T14:52:02.898-07:00Alla bara luras<br />De enda som inte luras är de luradeHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-24714697157370227642009-07-24T14:46:00.000-07:002009-07-25T12:00:01.526-07:00<em>Strings of beads bind people together<br />When cut off beautiful pearls fall into the abyss<br />An argument<br />Shakes the pretty little beads who should one day become part of the network by throwing out<br />A string of beads<br />And hope it catches on<br />To their love<br />Evil is the being<br />Equipped with scissors<br />Ready to cut the strings between others<br />Both lies and truths may shake the beads or even cut the thread<br />Honored is the builder, the lover<br />Who asks for nothing in return<br />But only reinforces other strings of beads<br />The only string of beads which lasts forever<br />Is the string of all strings</em>Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-10102840232006054862007-11-14T12:04:00.000-08:002007-11-14T12:06:56.244-08:00<strong>Borders - a Classic Source of Conflict<br /></strong><br />Serbia’s Prime Minister Kostunica recently declared that "Preserving Kosovo and (Bosnia's autonomous) Serb Republic is now the primary goal of our state and national policy…." That statement was not well received in the West, and it shouldn’t be.<br /><br />Similarly, on a recent visit to Turkey, I heard the official statement that the primary objective of Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq is to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. Here, in my opinion, the Turks are diverging from their founding father’s principle: “Peace at home, peace abroad”. The chief objective of foreign policy should be just that: peace. And the purpose of borders should be to provide the best and most expedient way of organising populations so as to preserve peace and guarantee prosperity. To the extent that a nation or a movement has an agenda for a certain demarcation based on other considerations , it is a threat to peace.<br /><br />Last year, I confronted a secular democrat from Iraq (living under constant threat in Baghdad) with the hypothetical choice of continued civil war or a peaceful but divided Iraq. While stressing his strong will to preserve the current borders of the country where he grew up, he admitted that peace was more important.<br /><br />On the one hand, politically recognised borders should be in line with reality on the ground; on the other, the international community should not reward military aggression. Yet it is hard not to; usually those invited to peace talks will be the faction leaders with the most military muscle. Furthermore, deals are often struck far above the heads of constituents. Referendums that give constituents a voice would seem to be the civilised way of resolving territorial disputes, but there may be controversy on who gets to vote. The dispute over Western Sahara, where there are settlers from Morocco, is one example of that problem; another is Abkhazia, but for the opposite reason – the province had an ethnic Georgian majority before the war.<br /><br />On the Kosovo question, the pride and principles of the two sides collide. Endless wrangling has postponed resolution of the issue for years. Most recently it has become an element in multitopical deliberations between the US and Russia, together with missile defence, nuclear weapons and the treaty on conventional forces in Europe. Unfortunately, there appears to be no consensus at present. The scenarios we face are status quo and continued postponement, or division of the world’s nations into two camps -- those who recognise an independent Kosovo and those who don’t. The positions of Russia and the US are clear; relations within the EU are more complex. Europe would be greatly embarrassed if its diversity of views erupted into a rift, as on the US invasion of Iraq. But the Union survived that crisis. Those with far more to lose are the populations of Kosovo, Northern Iraq, Puntland, Somaliland, Northern Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Western Sahara and the Palestinian Territories, all of whom face an uncertain status and in many cases isolation.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-75011011827623637172007-11-11T11:37:00.000-08:002007-11-11T11:39:09.747-08:00<strong>From overmonitored rusty Kalashnikovs to stale cocktail receptions at the embassy - Joint training is the answer<br /></strong><br /><em>This is the unedited version of an article soon to be published in "New Routes"</em><br /><br />Visiting the weapons collection sites in the disarmament campaign in Macedonia four years ago as a monitor for the EU, I recall hearing the officials manning the collection points informing us that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe had been there just a while ago. Coordination was at times non-existent between our organisations and information was not shared from our side because of distrust of certain member states of the OSCE. Yet I also remember on later occasions how our EU monitors seamlessly reinforced the election observation mission of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. We reported everything observed up their chain of command just as the seconded ODIHR observers, or should I say most of them – because we all know that it happens that seconded personnel still primarily focus on reporting to their national authorities, weakening the concept of secondments to international organisations and their credibility.<br /><br />Conflict stricken societies are characterised by a myriad of external as well as internal actors with various agendas, pulling in different directions as they may have conflicting aspirations of what the end state should be. The interlocking layers of the diplomatic, political, economic and societal networks constitute a complex web of interrelationships, dependencies, allegiances and conflict. Global competition between super powers may be an influence just as the personal relation between Ambassador X and Deputy Head of Mission Y or the fact that Police Commissioner Z simply is not comfortable with going to cocktail parties and exchanging niceties.<br /><br />Moreover, cooperation may be difficult even among actors from the same country but representing different outfits under separate ministries. The set backs in Operation Iraqi Freedom have pin-pointed frictions in the great US war machinery incorporating the Pentagon, Langley and Department of State. The smaller UK structures have successfully integrated ministries and military in what is called a comprehensive or whole of government approach. Integration of military and civilian government assets have been tried with various succes in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. There are political forces striving for integrating military and civilian components under unified command and the temptation to use military resources for humanitarian tasks is not new. However, the professional humanitarian aid workers are sceptical to the military taking over their domain. Not for being afraid of losing their turf, but stating that humanitarian assistance is not an easy task without pitfalls. A well meaning effort may actually cause damage in the long run. The salty humanitarians who often reach the conflict zone long before any international military force speak of their “humanitarian space” – they mean let us do our job, so you can do yours. This opinion sometimes conflicting with the will to integrate actors in peace support under unified command.<br /><br />Regardless of where one stands on the question of integrating efforts or preserving integrity of specific actors everyone agrees that awareness and understanding of the other actors in the field radically increases efficiency. Hence, joint training platforms such as the Viking exercises and courses with mixed-multifunctional groups of participants are instrumental in enhancing the capabilities of tomorrows peacemakers. Peace building will probably always be complex and messy, but one misunderstanding more during training is hopefully one less out on the mission. Joint training builds multidisciplinary networks overarching organisational and departmental limitations. Bonds and even friendships are forged, promoting smooth cooperation and interfunctional understanding.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-57686208126776367602007-08-06T12:25:00.000-07:002007-11-03T05:37:40.872-07:00<span style="font-family:times new roman;"><strong>Moskvas Kazanstation – Här börjar Asien<br /></strong><br />Jag anländer med tåg från södra Ryssland – Kuban – den svarta bördiga jorden och kossackernas land. Bagagebärarna som möter mig har tatariska anletsdrag; halvsmala ögon, höga kindknotor och platta ansikten.<br /><br />Det liksom bubblar i Moskva – ryssar och ryssländare tycks utbyta känsloyttringar så mycket mer frekvent än oss svenskar. Vagnvärdinnan som så moderligt tog hand om oss med hett kaffe och rena lakan, bannade mig även för att jag slängde toalettpapper i toalletten.<br /><br />Mitt tåg från Georgiska gränsen heter ”Sochi”, som det passerar genom efter sin startpunkt på gränsen till utbrytarrepubliken Abkhazien med dess irredentistiska tendenser. Namnet Sochi hade stor prestige som semesterort redan innan de fick OS – nu talar alla om miljardprojekt och raketfarande fastighetspriser. Gemene man verkar dock tro att det bara är eliten som tjänar på historien. ”De rika kommer bara bli rikare” sa taxichauffören med brezjnevögonbryn och kaukasisk brytning.<br /><br />De andra tågen heter ”Tatarstan”, ”Mordova” och ”Chuvash” efter minoriteters republiker i det som geografiskt är europeiska ryssland. Tatarerna och chuvasherna talar turkiska språk medan mordvinska klassas som finsk-ugriskt.<br /><br />Utanför stationen lastar två poliser en civilbil full med meloner. Försäljarna har åkt tåg med sina meloner hela vägen från Tashkent. ”De kunde inte komma överens” förklarar en bondkvinna om varför hennes grannförsäljare blev av med hela sitt parti. En yngling i orange t-skjorta dokumenterade beslaget med sin mobilkamera. Han blev tyvärr lite nervös när jag frågade honom om han var journalist.<br /><br />I denna ”Former Soviet Republic of Gazpromistan” ser det snart ut som de statskontrollerade energibolagen snart har egen beväpnad personal (såsom Reuters rapporterat har lagförsaget passerat första omröstningen). Men å andra sidan finns det positiv utveckling i ekonomin; i mina svärförädrars före detta kolkhozby tycks fler och fler få hyfsat betalda jobb i Sibirien. Somliga jobbar varannan månad, lediga varannan för att koppla av hemma i byn.<br /><br />Men svärfar bara förbannar rikets situation och alla ledare sedan Brezjnev. Han flög helikopter i Röda Armén. Vi dricker hembrännt och han gör långa utläggningar om sionisterna och frimurarna som avsiktligt krossade och styckade Sovjetunionen. Hans favorittidning är <em>Zavtra</em> (imorgon), men den borde heta igår, såsom den antisemiterar. Och visst, många av oligarkerna är judar, så det finns alltid näring till sådan retorik. Tidningen är för övrigt något dyrare än de andra och helt reklamfri.<br /><br />Nu sitter jag på färjan hem. Jag är som vanligt full av intryck från det som blivit mitt andra hemland och min dotter är nog likaså; hon fick uppleva ryskt lantliv; äta oförädlade grönsaker och jaga katter och höns runt datjan.</span>Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1158430616542216172006-09-16T11:10:00.000-07:002006-09-16T11:16:56.553-07:00<strong>Urbana livsnjutare röstar "Ja" till trängselskatt</strong><br /><br />Tänk efter nu precis hur du vill ha det när du sitter på utecafé, sörplar på en dubbel espresso, läser "Under strecket" eller DN Kultur och väntar på en bekant du inte träffat på länge. Självklart vill man att förbipasserande bilar skall hållas till ett minimum.<br /><br />För ett flanervänligt, behagligt, angenämnt och njutbart Stockholm - Rösta "Ja"!Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com17tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1158005794356128362006-09-11T12:54:00.000-07:002006-09-11T13:21:24.623-07:00<strong>SPIRITUAL FEMINISM REVISITED - THE PEACOCK FEATHER: SIX STORIES FOR SIX NIGHTS, BY LJILJANA HABJANOVIC DJUROVICH</strong><br /><br />Many consider progress has been made in female empowerment now that women are in the work force and even reach high positions in male dominated spheres. Yet, the entertainment sector has become highly siliconized and sexual harrasment is commonplace at schools. I acknowledge some positive developments, but the missing link in today's feminism, I argue, is the sacredness of fertility. Dan Brown touched upon the subject in "The Da Vinci Code", but a much more powerful mouthpiece for spiritual feminism is of course a woman; Ljiljana Habjanovich Djurovich. "The Peacock Feather" can be considered a modern addendum to the gnostic gospel.<br /><br />However, the author/prophet displays her affection and glorification of the Proto-Slavs with statements such as:<br /><br /><em>"They</em> [the Slavs] <em>conquered foreign territories and lost everything on them. Divided into many tribes they scattered all over Europe like a broken necklace. They mixed their blood and language with other peoples. They learned to lie and to hate, and to be treacherous."</em><br /><br />Still the mythical idealization of the author's ancestors is a minor element in "The Peacock Feather", much more dominant is the weaving together of the Bible, Greek, Egyptian, Hindu, Slavic and Persian myths and symbolism. The thread throughout the six stories is woman herself and the eye that looks upon the reader from the peacock feather. At the same time it is a call against dogmatism; on the last page Mary says:<br /><br /><em>"My son wanted people to understand God better. And he wanted to teach them that God was not addressed or served by merely sticking to the strict rules, but by true love."</em><br /><br />Published by: Narodna Knjiga, Belgrade 2000<br /><br />On the topic of Peacocks it is interesting to note that the central figure in the Yezidis' faith is Melek-Taus, the peacock angel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melek_Taus)Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1145735483776825272006-04-22T12:49:00.000-07:002006-08-18T14:18:47.903-07:00<strong>Some thought on our Scandinavian (or Western) individualism</strong><br /><br />At Ikea a sign read <em>”Being single has both advantages and disadvantages, but the situation at home is definitely one of the advantages. My cottage has traces of everything in my personality and I enjoy the garden, cooking and spending hours reading without being disturbed. Yet at the same time the rest of the world is just a phone call away.”</em><br /><br />It makes you think. More and more people in our part of the world live by themselves now. Once we lived in big families, grandparents, aunts, uncles and children all together. These days care of the elderly and children is institutionalized and Scandinavia, the supposed model societies, lead the world in this regard. Our social organization is developing in a pattern of entropy. Early on we teach our children their individual responsibility and the lyrics we listen to have for many generations emphasized the individual. Remember Frank Sinatra’s “I did it my way” our Jon Bon Jovi’s “It’s my life.” On the subject of lyrics, also worth pondering upon is the message of Twisted Sister’s “We’re not gonna take it” and Madonna’s “Papa don’t preach” – rebellion against parents. By no means do I want to hold these musicians responsible for the atomization of our families and the diminishing respect for age, but they are indicators of the trends in society. And certainly western individualism has deeper roots, many say in the Renaissance and secularization. <br /><br />Then maybe someone considers the rise of the individual from the chains of patriarchal oppression as a positive development and not related to suicides and the growing phenomena of stress, “burning out” and depression. My answer is, widen the perspective to the evolutionary level; how do you think we are biologically fitted to live, alone or in a flock?<br /><br />Milan Kundera wrote in “The Unbearable lightness of being” about the temptation to be independent as it is seemingly easier to stand alone without burdensome relations and Camus’ “Stranger” was untouched by the death of his own mother, but angst is omnipotent in these works. Also, recall the empty conversations in Ingmar Bergman’s movies between people which one would think should be close. Many have realized that what has happened in our society is anything but positive. But in the end I am optimistic as our countries are seeing a great influx of immigrants from the East and South, from countries less affected by individualism. Hence, I am convinced we must open the gates to our so-called welfare states widely. That Kurdish janitor that cleans your office is here to save you, and you should learn from him.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1142363285815411282006-03-14T11:03:00.000-08:002006-03-14T11:08:05.833-08:00<strong>Är Islam en krigisk religion som skall bemötas med demokratiska korståg? – Några reflektioner</strong><br /><br /><em>(Den oklippta versionen av min debattartikel i Hufvudstadsbladet 19 Maj 2005)</em><br /><br />När jag bodde i Azerbajdzjans huvudstad Baku hösten 1997, njöt jag av att höra en grannkvinna sjunga böner den 19:de varje månad. (Hennes man hade avlidit den 19:de fick jag förklarat för mig). Jag gick ut på gatan för att höra bättre. Arabiska med azerisk accent är len och harmonisk, och hennes toner uttryckte vemod och ångest, men kanske fanns där förhopningen att deras själar skulle återförenas i nästa liv. Hur som helst så fann jag hennes böner spirituellt upplyftande, likaså tilltalades min själ av böneutropen från minareterna. Sista dagen i Baku gick jag runt på stan med Emil, en av sönerna i min värdfamilj. De bodde för övrigt i Bakus gamla stadskärna, omgärdad av en mur från 1300-talet, med slingrande gränder och ett dussintal moskéer, den äldsta från 1200-talet. Vi gick förbi en av de andra moskéerna vid bönetiden. Jag stannade till när jag hörde det långa utdragna ”Allaaahu akbar” och tårarna flödade ner längs mina kinder. Ja, så mycket älskar jag självmordsbombarnas religion.<br />Min religionsprofessor på Marlboro College i Vermont, Baptistpastorn James E. Thomas menade att det är missledande att tala om en Islam, när det i själva verket finns en hel uppsjö av tolkningar och versioner. Skönheten må vara överväldigande, men alltjämt finns där krigiska element i flera av de utbredda tolkningarna. I en annan del av världen mötte jag en Mufti (motsvarar ungefär biskop) som drog fram sin pistol när jag satt på hans kontor, för att ge eftertryck åt sitt krav på att polisen skulle dra tillbaka sina vägspärrar från hans distrikt. Likaså förnekade han inte sitt förflutna i landets gerrilla.<br />Korståg, folkmord och tvångskonverteringar (inte minst av samer och finnar) må svärta västerlandets historia, men i 2000-talets annars så galna värld är våld i Jesu namn en tämligen marginell företeelse. Frestande är det kanske att jämföra Muhammed och Jesus gärningar, där den förste lade grunden för ett imperium medan den senare framställs mer som att ha lett en misslyckad civil olydnadskampanj (som ju i och för sig bar frukt tre århundraden senare när Romarriket accepterade Kristendomen). Och så judarna, efter årtusenden av förtryck skapar de en apartheidstat som bedriver aktiv expansionism motiverat med de heliga skrifterna, är de mindre krigiska? Nåväl, ingen blir klokare av att dra sådana generaliseringar det är i princip lika hopplöst som att diskutera om Muhammed var pedofil eller inte (den debatt som pågått i Sverige på sistone).<br />Välkänt är dock att Islam används som ideologi för Al-Qaida, talibanerna och irakiska motståndet. Till en viss utsträckning användes religion även i retoriken från Saddam Husseins från början sekulära regim. När man dock (stödda av USA) låg i krig med shi’itiska Iran fann Hussein det lämpligt att lägga till orden Allahu Akbar på nationens flagga. När man sedan fann sig i konflikt med USA och dess kristna allierade fick Islam en större roll i regimens utspel. Saddams medier basunerade ut under de sista åren att han skrivit en Koran i sitt eget blod. Men baathregimens Irak hann aldrig bli mer islamistiskt än vad Bush den yngres USA är Krist-fundamentalistiskt. Bushs stöd från den kristna högern var instrumentalt i hans seger 2000, mycket tack vare att han offentligt deklarerade sig som en evangelisk Kristen. Dock har kristendomen endast en subtil roll i i Bushs motivation till kriget. De angivna skälen att Irak hade eller var på väg att skaffa massförstörelsevapen och var delaktigt i 11 september attackerna har redan belysts (och knäckts) i media, men där finns faktiskt element av korståg, om än ej i Guds men i demokratins namn, med syftet att sprida demokrati med vapens hjälp. Jag tar upp detta för att avrunda min argumentation om Islams roll i krigisk retorik, därför att min uppfattning är inte att utövarna av islam är mer krigiska än kristna. Det faktum att islam oftare än kristendomen idag avänds för att motivera krig beror snarare på att de kristna länderna är mer sekulariserade. Men för att förstå krigets retorik i väst anser jag att man bör överge den snävt definerade termen religion och istället tala om värderings- och trosystem. Vi i väst är ju lika övertygade om demokratins rättfärdighet som talibanerna är (ja de finns kvar) att mullorna skall styra. Mellanöstern kommer knappast bli fredligare och rättvisare av fler angreppskrig i demokratins namn. Kanske bör man istället närmare studera och kanske låna delar av den iranska modellen av kombinerad teokrati och demokrati, även om den förstnämnda är alltför dominant (uppenbart efter President Khatamis misslyckade försök till perestrojka) för att systemet i sin helhet skall falla oss västerlänningar i smaken. Som djupt övertygad om än ej konfirmerad demokrat vill jag argumentera för att folken i Mellanöstern skall få forma sin egen politiska framtid och vi måste alla lämna de dominerande tankegångarna om civilisationernas kamp.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1139001809601669892006-02-03T13:11:00.000-08:002006-02-07T07:15:10.590-08:00<strong>Champions of chauvinism join the security apparatus</strong><br /><br />While the colonization of America gave birth to the mythical cowboy, the Russian Empire’s closest equivalent are the Cossacks. Starting as loose bands which for various reasons settled in the periphery of the Empire, they developed into military units and outpost communities. As they largely sided with the Whites in the revolution they were persecuted by the Soviet regime, but were reinstated during the Yeltsin years to augment law enforcement as well as border guards. However, as times have changed, the new Cossacks have adapted to the realities of post-Soviet Russia and have become opaque but influential entities with tentacles stretching into business as well as politics. During the nineties the Don and Kuban Cossacks became infamous for participating as volunteers in a number of conflicts, including Bosnia, Trans-Dniestr(1) and Abkhazia.(2) Most importantly, racism against indigenous Caucasians, the historical arch-enemies of the Cossacks, radiate through the mafia-like structure(3) of contemporary Cossacks, yet the Kremlin has now by law incorporated the Cossacks in the security structures.<br /><br />Krasnodar (Kuban Cossacks) – Harassing non-Russians and non-Orthodox<br />Meshkhetian Turks having resettled from Krasnodar to Tucson, Arizona, claim having been harassed by Cossacks. "If we grow our own vegetables or food, we could not sell them. . . The Cossacks had their own stores and would not let us sell," Akhmed Aslanov, one of the refugees, told a reporter from the Tucson Citizen.(4) The Washington Post revealed that, Aslanov is only one of 5 000 Meskhetian Turks who have resettled in the US this past year as the Cossacks are spearheading a campaign of “soft ethnic cleansing,” according to Alexander Osipov, an analyst at the Institute for Humanities and Political Studies in Moscow. In the same article, Sarvar Tedorov, a community leader from Varenikovskaya states; “How can Putin make police out of people who have no respect for the law?. . . Is he completely blind? They break into our houses, even during prayer. They humiliate us and call us names. The beatings are regular.”(5) Recent reports also indicate Cossacks have threatened British journalists attempting to document the plight of the Meshkhetian Turks(6) as well as the local Hare Krishna.(7) A Yerevan paper reported that Armenians in the Krasnodar territory also are targeted by the Cossacks and that the actions are encouraged by local authorities.(8) <br /> <br /><br />Rostov (Don Cossacks) – Hand in hand with the authorities<br />The leader of the Don Cossacks, Viktor Vodolatski, also serves as Vice Governor of Rostov oblast and stated in August that his Cossacks could restore order and “quickly teach the new arrivals” how to behave. When a group of Chechens reportedly raped the daughter of the Cossack leader in Remontnoye, Vodolatski mustered some 500 Cossacks who converged on the village but were blocked by nearly a thousand Russian Interior Ministry troops. Although, subsequently the Interior Ministry’s special unit OMON began to conduct joint patrols with the Cossacks in Remontnoye, searching the residences of non-Russian arrivals from the northern Caucasus for contraband and checking their documentation in order to determine whether any of them were there illegally and thus, allegedly, constituted a threat to the residents of this village.(9) Interestingly, there exists a group of unregistered Don Cossacks, led by Nikolai Kositsyn, rivals to Vodolatski’s recognized organization.(10) <br /><br />Crimea – Confronting the Tatars<br />In coastal Crimea which is subject to a large number of property conflicts, some of these have ethnic connotations. Opposing the Crimean Tatars having returned from deportation are also groups calling themselves Cossacks, although the reporter of RFE/RL meeting some of them in Feodosia last year concluded they “look like skinheads”. In that case the stand-off between Cossacks and Tatars was over the latters’ plans to build a cultural centre on disputed land, but an argument raised by the Cossacks was the Crimean Tatars’ supposed separatist agenda and links to Muslim fundamentalists. RFE/RL also learned that most of the Cossacks camping out at the disputed beach property were not Ukrainian Cossacks, but from Krasnodar and Rostov.(11) <br /><br />Mobilization in local politics<br />One oddity in the otherwise highly predictable recent local elections shows that the Cossacks are not always obedient henchmen of the authorities. Their grass-roots support makes them a force of their own to reckon with, whose agenda might not always be in line with that of Kremlin’s favourites. In the village of Azovskaya, outside Krasnodar, Igor Vasyuta the incumbent and protegé of the regional authority was defeated by Aleksey Podobny the candidate of the local Cossacks with more than a 20 per cent margin.(12) Also in other areas Cossack representatives were elected to local government, the Okrug of Ust’-Medvednitski in the Volgograd saw 40 Cossacks elected for office. The words of the deputy head of Volgograd’s provincial administration Jurij Sizov, that the Cossacks are capable of both stabilizing the situation in the south of Russia as well as coming to the defence of her borders indicate good relations between Cossacks and local power in that area.(13) <br /><br />Formalizing their status<br />Now commonplace vigilantes and informal reinforcements to the police, the Cossacks are in the process of being incorporated into the regular law enforcement and security apparatus. Putin in April submitted a bill to the State Duma that would allow Cossacks to serve as soldiers, police, and border guards. The bill passed the Duma on 9 November and was published in Rossiskaya Gazeta a month later. The law stipulates Cossacks will serve with the Ministry of Interior as well as border guards, taking part in upholding public order, dealing with environmental hazards, fires and terrorism.(14) In a press conference on 15 December, Vodolatski went further, claiming that partial responsibility for securing borders and enforcing customs would through agreements be transferred to the Cossacks.(15) <br /><br />Words of warning<br />Osipov (aforementioned analyst) warned against the measure; “Who enters Cossack organizations? Former - or even serving - police officers, former army officers, or simply losers, collective-farm members who tend to drink too much vodka. On the whole, people with nationalist, archaic views.”(18) In a similar vein, Aleksandr Golts, a military expert and deputy editor of Yezhednevnyi Zhurnal, asserts that “. . . we have a lot of examples of them organizing something like lynch-courts.”(17) The elements described in this manner have been elevated to a place of honor as Putin’s presidential guard now includes two squadrons of Cossack cavalry. Moreover, Edgar Saroyan, a correspondent with the RIA-Novosti news agency in the Northern Caucasus warns that arming the Cossacks would further destabilize the North Caucasus.(18) Alarming is perhaps the paragraph of the law that specifically mentions that the Cossacks should be enlisted in the fight against terrorism.(19) Lessons learned from other places in the world indicate this could bode ill for the already shaky respect of human rights in Russia.<br /><br />Notes<br />1. Grau, Lester W. “The Cossack Brotherhood Reborn: A Political/military Force in a Realm of Chaos” The Foreign Military Studies Office; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/cossack/cossack.htm#68, originally published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 1993.<br />2. Gordienko, Anatolij. “Abkhaziya gotovitsya k yugoslavskomu tsenariyu” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, No 49(458), 23 December, 2005; http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2005-12-23/1_abhazia.html. <br />3. The description of the Cossacks as ”mafia” is that of a local source who wishes to remain anonymous. <br />4. Revere, C.T., “City opens arms to thankful family” Tucson Citizen, 24 November, 2005; http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/intucson/history_culture/112405a1_ct_thanksgiving.<br />5. Finn, Peter, “Revival of Cossacks Casts Muslim Group Out of Russia to U.S.” Washington Post Foreign Service, 18 November, 2005; Page A19 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702014.html. <br />6. “British Journalists Get Personal Lesson in Cossack Intimidation Tactics” FSU Monitor, 6 October, 2005; http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/100605Russ2.shtml. <br />7. ”Orthodox Activists, Cossacks Attack Hindu Festival in South Russia” MosNews, 6 October, 2005; http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/10/06/krishnabeaten.shtml. <br />8. Ria Novosti, 29 April, 2005; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050429/39761709.html citing Aikakan Zhamanak, 21 April, 2005.<br />9. Goble, Paul, “Window on Eurasia: Will Russia’s Cossacks Again Repress Non-Russian Minorities?” FSU Monitor, 10 August, 2005; http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/081005Russia.shtml. <br />10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 186, Part I, 3 October, 2005.<br />11. Krushelnycky, Askold. “Ukraine: Crimea's Tatars -- Uneasy Relations With Russian Cossacks” RFE/RL, 27 August 2004; http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/08/a2fee1cf-b0f6-41b6-9065-ea7f757374e1.html. <br />12. Reported by the local opposition paper Novaya Gazeta Kubani, No. 1119(94), 15 December, 2005; http://pressa.kuban.info/article/ngk/26375/.<br />13. “Kazaki idut vo vlast’” Volgograd v Seti 25 January, 2006; http://www.volgograd.ru/news/?new=28725. <br />14. Federalnyj zakon Rossiskoj Federatsii ot 5 dekabrya 2005 g. N 154-Ф3 “O gosudarstvennoj sluzjbye rossiskogo kazachestvo”; http://www.rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html. <br />15. “Viktor Volodatskij: Deyatelnost kazachestvo v Rossii uzakonena” IA Regnum, 16 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/561508.html. <br />16. Bigg, Claire, “Russia: Putin Takes Steps To Help Cossacks Restore Some Of Their Former Status” RFE/RL, 27 May, 2005; http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/01322f73-7f51-49f5-80c9-34371343f99c.html. <br />17. Parsons, Robert, “Cossack Revival Gains Momentum” RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies, Vol. 6, No. 8, 18 May, 2005.<br />18. Ibid.<br />19. Article V §4.3, Federalnyj zakon Rossiskoj Federatsii ot 5 dekabrya 2005 g. N 154-Ф3 O gosudarstvennoj sluzhbye rossiskogo kazachestvo; http://www.rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1137698705497361782006-01-19T11:08:00.000-08:002006-01-19T11:25:05.513-08:00<strong>North Caucasus in 2006 – Trouble behind and trouble ahead </strong><br /><br />The trend from 2004 of violence spreading from Chechnya to the greater North Caucasus region continues. Dagestan has now even passed Chechnya in number of attacks and the most significant event of the year was clearly the multiple strikes by insurgents in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria on the 13th of October. It is thus too late to speak of the conflict in Chechnya threatening to spread; in fact the Chechen conflict has already destabilized the surrounding region. The Kremlin will likely use the destabilization in the autonomous republics as a justification for strengthening vertical control over the region and weakening local self-government. The only example of actually increasing a minority’s role in local-self government was the creation of the Abazin municipality in Karachayevo-Cherkessia(1). An old strategy from Muscovy’s armory, that of co-opting a local clan and supporting their hold on power is what has been done in Chechnya with the Kadyrovs. However, Moscow does not wish the local leadership to be too strong, as the removal of Ruslan Aushev, former President of Ingushetia proved already in 2001(2), as well as the recent use of a “representative” for the south of Russia, Dmitri Kozak. A significant question for the Northwest Caucasus are the calls for splitting the artificially twinned republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia and conversely, the proposal of unifying Adygeya with Krasnodarski Krai. Separatist and irredentist tendencies may interact with other factors such as religious extremism, competition for local power as well as tension between centre and periphery in the continued spiral of destabilization. <br /><br />Chechnya calmer, but conflict spilling over<br />The killing of Chechnya’s separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov in March has been described both as a visible success for Russian hawks, and as an obstacle for any negotiated solution, as Maskhadov was the main moderate(3). While Russia’s security forces continue to strengthen their hold on Chechnya and at least some reconstruction funds end up with the needy(4), the situation is deteriorating in Dagestan which surpassed Chechnya in number of terrorist attacks in 2005. Moreover, the news agency ANN claims the Interior Ministry does not control up to 15 per cent of Dagestan’s territory and in the same article speculates on how interwoven ethnic- clan- and political affiliations may break up the republic and cause civil war(5). Kavkazski Uzel goes further already calling the current situation in Dagestan a “low-intensity civil war”(6). <br /><br />Brutality of authorities adding fuel to the fire<br />There are no indicators that earlier reported torture, extorting money from relatives of detainees and unjustified use of force have diminished. On the contrary, media in June exposed a brutal raid by the armed forces’ “Vostok” battalion, involving torching of houses and extrajudicial killings in the village of Borozdinovskaya, close to Chechnya’s border with Dagestan(7). One analysis concludes that the Chechenization of the conflict has led to further abuses and created a class of men dependent on the conflict to continue for their livelihood(8). Outside Chechnya last year’s tragedy in Beslan and this October’s insurgent attacks in the city of Nalchik have triggered a brutal clamp down on all devout Muslims. Police target those who go to the mosques and are said to be encouraged to make arrests in a manner much reminiscent of the Vietnam War’s infamous focus on the “body count”, according to IWPR’s correspondent in Karachai-Cherkessia. Consequences are easy to fathom, mosque goers will be pushed towards underground prayer sessions and to extremism after being humiliated by the police(9). Demonstrations in Nalchik by parents of the fighters indicate that the resistance movement is not run by outsiders such as Al-Qaeda, but relies on local support in Kabardino-Balkaria(10). <br /><br />The artificial twin-nationality republics<br />Gordon Hahn, an independent scholar cited by Russia Profile.org claims gerrymandering in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (KBR) generates Balkar nationalism, which is linked both to Karachai nationalism as well as to Islamic extremism:<br /><br /><em>"… there is the danger that pressure on the Kabard-dominated elite to clean up government and crime would drive some into the arms of the terrorists, thereby assisting the latter in building a multiethnic pan-Muslim, pan-Caucasus, Islamist movement/network. The Balkar minority, with only 10 percent of the KBR population, as a political outsider is being driven into the terrorists’ arms by the KBR elite’s clumsy efforts to incorporate Balkar districts into Kabard-dominated ones, prompting a revival of Balkar ethno-nationalism and calls for setting up a separate Balkar Republic. The Balkar-Karachai nationalist organization Jamagat, which may be tied to a combat jamaat of the same name in Karachevo-Cherkessiya, has verbally supported terrorist attacks in the KBR on its on-again, off-again, website Camagat.com."</em>(11) <br /><br />Thus, as extremists are gaining ground in the area, the highly sensitive issue of dividing the Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia Republics could if not handled carefully ignite more violence.<br /><br />Uniting Adygeya with Krasnodarski Krai<br />The issue has been raised to hold a referendum on unifying the Republic of Adygyea with her surrounding larger neighbour Krasnodarski Krai. On Ekho Moskvy Yuliya Latynina warned against this initiative, arguing that status quo was working well, security is not a problem in Adygeya, but swallowing the entity of the ethnic Adygeans into the Russian dominated Krasnodarski Krai would generate a nationalist back-lash and could even lead to violence. Also, she pointed out that the main propagators of the move, so-called Cossacks were more like “fascists”(12). <br /><br />Conclusions<br />Above mentioned events and trends paint a bleak picture for the North Caucasus in 2006. Continued unrest is to expect. Much of this can be attributed to the forceful and despotic policy of the Putin administration. Central is the failure to establish rule of law, which is undermined by the Kremlin’s tendency to give local favourites free reign and laissez-faire to human rights abuses. Also, paramount to establishing good governance with checks and balances is a functioning civil society. Grass roots initiatives could do a lot of good in this region where people have long lost their trust in central authorities. However, Putin’s course this year has been specifically to hamper the work of non-governmental organizations(13). Fearing to lose some control only increases Putin’s risks of losing all control in the North Caucasus. <br /><br />Notes<br /><br />1. ”V Karachevo-Cherkesi obrazovan novy rayon” Gazeta.ru, 29 December, 2005; http://www.gazeta.ru/lenta/2005/12/29/news_508510.shtml and “Abazinski rayon poyavitsya na karte Karachayevo-Cherkessii” IA REGNUM, 29 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/567866.html. <br /><br />2. Ware, Robert Bruce. ”In the North Caucasus All Sides Are Losing” Russia Profile.org; http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/article.wbp?article-id=C4439DC1-35E6-4660-955E-301AE6ED0046 and “An empire’s fraying edge” Economist, 12 February, 2005, p 23.<br /><br />3. Mstislavskaya, Mariya. “Basayev, Maskhadov i spor o beslanskom teraktye” Lenta.ru, 30 December, 2005; http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/12/30/caucasus/. <br /><br />4. “An empire’s fraying edge” Economist, 12 February, 2005, p 22.<br /><br />5. ”Eksperty: Dagestan ustroyen gorazdo slozjnyeye Chechni” ANN, 28 December, 2005; http://www.annews.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25806. <br /><br />6. “Dagestan: Khronika terrora (1996-2005gg)” Kavkazski Uzel, 30 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/chronics/id/790621.html.<br /><br />7. ”Pravozashitniki schitayut, shto bezjentsy iz Borozdinovskoi zjivut v kriticheskikh usloviyakh” IA REGNUM, 17 November, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/546160.html and Mariya Mstislavskaya. “Basayev, Maskhadov i spor o beslanskom teraktye” Lenta.ru, 30 December, 2005; http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/12/30/caucasus/.<br /><br />8. “V atmosferye strakha” MiK, 6 December 2005; http://www.iamik.ru/?op=full&what=content&ident=24745. <br /><br />9. Gukemukhov, Murat. “Fears and Arrests in Karachai-Cherkessia” IWPR, 17 December, 2005; http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=258721&apc_state=henh. <br />10. ”V Nalchike demonstranty khoteli szjet chuchela glavy MVD i muftiya” IA REGNUM, 30 December, 2005; http://www.regnum.ru/news/568515.html and Lyudmila Maratova. ”V Kabardino-Balkarii militsiya razognala piket roditeley pogibshikh boyevikov” Kavkazski Uzel, 30 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/913460.html.<br /><br />11. Hahn, Gordon. “On the Nalchik Raid and Russia's Islamist Revolution” Russia Profile.org; http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/article.wbp?article-id=C4439DC1-35E6-4660-955E-301AE6ED0046.<br /><br />12. Latynina, Yuliya. “Kod Dostupa” Ekho Moskvy, 24 December, 2005; http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/40795. The initiative has also been criticized in Azeri press, see: RIA Novosti, 30 December, 2005; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20051230/42801633.html. <br /><br />13. Feraposhkin, Vyacheslav. ”Lidery grazjdanskikh organizatsi nadyeyutsya shto prezident ne podpishet zakonoproyekt, uzjestochayuschi kontrol za NKO” Kavkazski Uzel, 23 December, 2005; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/909060.html.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1131231206008410182005-11-05T14:41:00.000-08:002005-11-05T14:53:26.016-08:00Words from the land of the Styx:<br /><br />"Men need images. Lacking them, they invent idols. Better then to found symbolic images on realities that leads toward the source of eternal conscious, than to the mindless pit of fear."<br /><br />Oracle of AmenHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1131203772491343882005-11-05T07:08:00.000-08:002010-09-21T11:48:36.023-07:00<strong>Destabilizing drought: A study of climatic disruptions’ influence on the Tajik civil war</strong><br /><br /><em>Below is my research plan. I am looking for sponsors and partners. Tips and feedback also welcome to henry.wathen @ gmail.com</em><br /><br />SUMMARY<br />Increasing scarcity of water and arable land in large parts of the world often coincide with unrest, civil war or even inter-state conflict. This dissertation seeks to shed light on the process of drought contributing to destabilisation in modern times, as well as how drought may drastically worsen the consequences of conflicts. The endeavour is not to seek to demonstrate that drought on its own causes conflicts, but to incorporate drought and its consequences into a holistic view of the process of destabilisation by focusing on drought’s interplay with a range of other factors. These factors include: political upheavals, interprovincal (or clan) rivalry, neighboring countries’ aspirations to impose influence as well as unclear land ownership and privatisation schemes, both of which are related to economic transition. The study will focus on Tajikstan, synthesising the findings of previous research relating to the environmental and climatic aspects of the 1992-1995 civil war, and in addition, qualitative interviews will be held with people having first-hand experience of the events leading up to the conflict as well as the war itself. Finally, comparisons will be made with other conflicts and the role of drought in those.<br /><br />HYPOTHESES<br />The envisaged research will seek to test to what extent drought contributed to the Tajik civil war by making water and arable land sought after commodities, thus triggering disputes over these. Furthermore, the study will assess the degree to which the droughts and floods preceeding the Tajik civil war had generated flows of internally displaced people and the extent and nature of impact these population movements had on the situation in the young republic.<br /><br />PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC<br />The study follows the general framework outlined by Leif Ohlsson in Livelihood Conflicts: Linking poverty and environment as causes of conflict, here modified to the Tajik circumstances. Ohlsson’s thesis that the loss of livelihoods may set the stage for armed conflict is the center piece in the case that this dissertation seeks to test. Other studies on the above mentioned theme, mainly concerning conflicts in Africa will also be consulted as references. These include the works of the anthropologist Paul Goldsmith, Ashok Swain of Uppsala University, UNEP and UNDP reports as well as the work done at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) by Nils Petter Gleditsch and Henrik Urdal inter alia.<br /><br />SOURCES AND METHODS<br />This study will initially survey a broad array of research and accounts of the civil war in Tajikstan, highlighting indicators of ecological/climatic impact of the sort described above, even when as in the vast majority of works on the conflict, these factors are far from the center of the authors’ focus. Russian sources will be used, but cautiously, as Yeltsin’s Russia was actively involved in the conflict. The completed collection of mostly peripheral comments by past observers and researchers on drought’s destabilizing role in the run-up to the conflict and its role in worsening the war’s impact will form the base for the study.<br />Added to this will be qualitative interviews with the purpose of gauging the perceptions of those affected by the conflict on the impact of drought in the destabilization of Tajikstan, in order to determine if the people “on the ground” place more importance to drought in the destabilization of Tajikstan than what has been conveyed by academics, journalists and other observers.<br /><br />RELEVANCE FOR RESEARCH<br />The now substantial number of climatologists asserting that earth’s carbondioxide level, temperature and precipitation pattern are currently undergoing significant changes is cause for concern. Disruptions in the precipitation pattern often mean drought in one end of an oscillation area and floods in the other. (The best example of an oscillation area with vast impact on the world’s precipitation pattern is the Southern Pacific, where the peaks are known as el Niňo and la Niňa). If the frequency and magnitude of these occurences are increasing, societal consequences loom. Weak states can slide further down the destabilization spiral and in areas already affected by conflict, the consequences of these may be fuelled, as stated above. To this day, the link between climate and armed conflict remains an understudied topic, although this has begun to change.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1130086260471081012005-10-23T09:36:00.000-07:002005-12-16T10:25:09.750-08:00<strong>Tajikstan has banned headscarves in public schools...</strong><br /><br />Restricting freedom of religious expression is never a good idea and let's ponder upon possible reactions and consequences. First of all, the measure risks alienating devout muslims and adding to fragmentation of society. Certainly, we didn't see adverse consequences of France's ban on religious symbols in the education sphere, (the riots don't seem to be linked to this) but Tajikstan is not France. Bordering Afghanistan and recently troubled Uzbeikstan, coupled with Tajikstans indigenous delicate balancing of Islam and secularism illustrates the country's fragile predicament. The civil war is far from forgotten and many of the fighters are still unemployed.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1129401844860328992005-10-15T11:37:00.000-07:002005-10-15T12:05:37.343-07:00<strong></strong><strong>Quote of the day</strong> <strong></strong><br /><br />I apologize for lying to you..... I promise not to deceive you, except in matters of this sort./Spiro T. AgnewHenryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1129392885053778052005-10-15T09:08:00.000-07:002005-10-23T11:14:27.333-07:00<strong>Morot, piska och budskap i världspolitiken</strong><br /><br /><em>Politiska, militära, konventionella och okonventionella medel har sedan antiken brukats i noll-summespel mellan härskare. Mycket har dock förändrats i omständigheterna runt krig, diplomati, kupper och maktkamp. I det informationsgenomsyrade globala samhället ligger tonvikten i realpolitik mer på information och opinionsbildande än på konventionella vapen. <br />I Johannes Wahlströms artiklar i Stockholms Fria Tidning (http://www.stockholmsfria.nu/artikel/4056)och Ordfront (http://www.ordfront.se/Ordfrontmagasin/Artiklar/Ukraina.aspx) belystes Västs inblandning i den oranga revolutionen i Ukraina. De stora media däremot fokuserade på den i och för sig häpnadsväckande förgiftningen av Jusjtjenko och pro-Moskva lägrets manipulationer. Ämnet manipulation är alltjämt högaktuellt från Caracas till Kirgisien och sällan är det bara en aktör med fingrarna i syltburken. </em><br /><br />Clintons fredsmäklare Richard Holbroke, talade senast han var i Sverige om lärdomarna från 90-talets internationella insatser på västra Balkanhalvön. Han använde det vanliga uttrycket ”piska och morot” om de medel man brukade. (Intressant nog har den amerikanska örnen ett knippe pilar mellan klorna på ena sidan och en olivkvist mellan de andra.) Nyligen talade jag med en högt uppsatt engelsk diplomat ansvarig för Albanien. Denne betonade mer nödvändigheten för det internationella samfundet att använda moroten som piska. Ett exempel på detta är kanske hur USA fick Serbien att utelämna Milosevic genom att hota med att strypa biståndet, eller rysk bestraffning av Georgien och Ukraina med högre pris på naturgas. Morotens klassiska tillämpning däremot användes effektivt 2001 när CIA-män reste runt i Afghanistan med väskor fulla av pengar och köpte krigsherrars lojalitet, sägs det. Afghanistan skiljer sig dock från Balkanländerna i den mån att landet är så underutvecklat, därmed användes realpolitikens redskap på klassiskt vis. Svensk militär personal i Afghanistan har under de senaste månaderna funnit isolerade bergsbyar där befolkningen fortfarande trott att Sovjetunionen ockuperade landet. I andra fall, i samhällen där befolkningen överskyls av information är den amerikanska örnens mäktigaste vapen varken pilarna eller olivkvisten; den amerikanske örnen vinner därför att den skriker högst och överröstar alla andra. Se bara på NATO:s presskonferenser vid upptakten till Kosovokriget, vilka grovt överdrev antalet flyktingar och döda. Sanningen om NATO:s desinformation uppdagades visserligen, men då hade nyhetsvärdet försvunnit och få lyssnade. (http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=572&a=231339&previousRenderType=2) <br /><br />Hur som helst så är de mellanstatliga konflikter jag nämnt del av en krympande kategori. Mer vanliga idag är inbördeskrig och intern maktkamp, om än nästan alltid med någon form av utländsk inblandning. Denna tendens blev tydlig i och med kalla krigets vänsterregimer med högergerrilor och vice versa. Då liksom nu var örnens skrik präglade av västs synsätt vad gäller demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter och marknadsekonomi (även om det mest var det sistnämnda elementet i ideologin som i praktiken eftersträvades). Men så skedde Västvärldens storartade seger; murens fall och sammetsrevolutionerna som sedan blev modeller för dagens maktkamper. Krasst generaliserande kan man konstatera att Radio Free Europe hade mer inflytande på murens fall än Pershing II-missilerna. Moroten fanns där också i form av förhoppningar av ett bättre liv hos både folkdjup och elit. (Med facit i hand ser vi dock att det bara var eliten som fick sin morot). Visst kan man också hävda att Västvärldens seger var ideologisk, och när då ett budskap segrar så är det genom information och kommunikation.<br /><br />På Balkanhalvön umgicks jag med en amerikansk West Point-utexaminerad, nu civilanställd hos NATO, som arbetade med ”info ops” (informationsoperationer). I jämförelse med sitt förflutna i infanteriet beskrev han sitt nuvarande jobb som ”samma sak men i andra änden av maskineriet”. ”Psy ops”, psykologisk krigföring var en central del av hans sysselsättning, som han undvek att beskriva i detalj. Klart framstod dock att det handlade om att påverka opinionsblidning. Jag träffade under de sista två åren också en lång rad balkanpolitiker. Bläddrandes i min anteckningsbok blir jag varse om att ”manipulation” hör till de mest förekommande orden, vilket även känns väldigt bekant från mina tidigare möten med politiker från före detta Sovjetunionen. Hur många gånger fick jag inte höra att den och den journalisten, politikern, rebellen eller gangstern var ett verktyg för parti X eller stormakt Y. Alla sådana anklagelser bör tas med en nypa salt, men mycket tyder ändå på att just manipulering är det främsta medlet i dagens realpolitik. Individer manipuleras med pengar eller utpressning och folket manipuleras med propaganda. Detta för kanske tankarna till den kända liknelsen med marionetter som kontrolleras av dolda mästare, men verkligheten liknar mer glöd som blåses på såväl öppet som dolt. <br /><br />I många länder där det glöder idag har media och det civila samhället nyckelroller. Självklart finns där också diplomater och eller agenter som agerar för sitt lands upplevda intressen. De suddiga gränserna mellan alla dessa aktörer ger bränsle till konspirationsteorier, vilka i sig ofta nyttjas i propagandan. Den välkände judiske informatonsmogulen George Soros maktposition ger näring åt klassisk antisemitism. Soros fotfolk är för övrigt inte längre välkomna i Uzbekistan, amerikanska militären likaså. 29 juli deklarerade uzbekiska utrikesdepartementet att amerikanerna hade 180 dagar på sig att förflytta sina soldater och flygplan från uzbekiskt territorium. I vårt närområde är Polen aktivt i Vitryssland genom stöd till oppositionella och till Vitrysslands polska minoritet. Lukasjenkos senaste motdrag var att förbjuda utländskt bistånd till politiska aktiviteter.<br /><br />Vi får också se vad som händer i Azerbajdzjan som går till val i november. En rörelse vid namn ”Yeni Fikir” (Nytänkande) har bildats efter georgisk och ukrainsk modell. Det blev kännt den 4 augusti att dess ledare Ruslan Bashirli blivit arresterad och myndigheterna anklagar honom, såväl som amerikanska National Democratic Institute (NDI) och ärkefienden Armeniens säkerhetstjänst för inblandning i ett försök till olagligt regimskifte. NDI leds av ingen annan än Madeleine Albright. Myndigheterna går hårt fram i sin kontrarevolutionära iver, orangea plagg beslagtas i Bakus butiker rapporterade www.mosnews.com 19 augusti (http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/08/19/orangenon.shtml). <br /><br />I Ryssland har president Putin ända sedan år 2000 gradvis stärkt kontrollen över media. Nu har han även börjat koppla ett (judo)grepp om det civila samhället. Senast väckte han stor oro när han kritiserade utländsk finansiering av det civila samhällets aktörer. Även intressant i relation till detta tema är att Putins sympatisörer har startat en ”patriotisk och antifascistisk” ungdomsorganisation vid namn ”Nasji” (De Våra). Företeelsen är klart och tydligt regimens reaktion till revolutionerna i Georgien, Ukraina och Kirgisien. Dessa ungdomar skall stoppa de orangea i Ryssland. Under denna sommar har tusentals av dem skolats i retorik, politik och andra färdigheter varvat med idrottsaktiviteter vid ett flertal läger. Företeelsen är inte helt ny, utan snarare en ny Komsomol anpassad till 2000-talet.<br /><br />Det skulle vara fördelaktigt om konflikter mer skulle utkämpas med hjälp av ökad information, muntlig argumentation och förhandling och vapnens roll minskades. Vi är tyvärr långt därifrån idag. Kontrollen över information och opinionsbildande kan tyvärr utnyttjas i negativa och farliga syften. Se bara på hatradioprogrammen som manade till folkmord i Rwanda 1994. Man bör inte heller vara blind för manipulation även bland oss stabila EU-medborgare. Många oroades ju över Berlusconis kontroll över den italienska mediamarknaden.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15321309.post-1124138591830297242005-08-15T13:40:00.000-07:002005-08-15T14:03:46.166-07:00<strong><span style="font-size:130%;">Only diplomacy can save Iraq</span></strong><br /><br />(The article below is the English language version of my op-ed piece in Helsinki’s <em>Hufvudstadsbladet</em> published 1 June 2005.)<br /><br /><em>The US should bear in mind the words of the ancient Chinese martial philosopher Sun Tzu:<br />“When a general is morally weak and his authority has lost its rigor, when his orders and directives lack wisdom, then his army becomes disoriented, and chaos is born”</em><br /><br />Two years after toppling Saddam Hussein, the US, Britain and the dwindling coalition of the willing have still failed to establish law and order in Iraq. A new approach is needed and other actors need to step in. Otherwise, the death-dealing violence in that country will continue to threaten stability in the region and fuel more anti-Western terrorism worldwide.<br />Admittedly, there is no simple solution to the complex problems of post-Saddam Iraq, where a multitude of domestic political actors as well as external forces hold high stakes. But no solution at all will be possible unless certain major mistakes are corrected. One of these was that the January elections failed to include the Sunni minority in the process of democratization. Another was the Bush rhetoric about the axis of evil and other pressure on Iran and Syria, which denied these countries the chance of mantling any official role in the crisis in their own neighborhood. More is needed, though, than just correcting past mistakes. A shift of paradigm is essential, from unilateral force to inclusive dialogue. Military action by itself will not restore order in Iraq; instead, the emphasis should be on generating a true peace process. The root causes of the bloody resistance are not being addressed, and by continuing to pound Iraqi towns, kicking in doors and firing liberally in all directions, the US and its allies will only further inflame the hostility of the Iraqis.<br />As long as Iraq is a failed state, terrorist groups will be able to set up bases there, training and preparing for missions in other areas. Saudi Arabia, which already has a growing problem with Islamist terrorists, may be experiencing spillover from Iraq. Syria, too, may eventually suffer from tolerating the activities of the Iraqi resistance on their soil. For domestic political reasons, Assad did not dare to strike against the flow of arms and people to these groups. But just as the PLO grew into a state within a state in both Lebanon and Jordan, the Iraqi groups may eventually threaten stability in Syria. In addition to these local effects, a continuing jihad in Iraq will likely inspire extremists to strike again against the US and its allies.<br />Several commentators have attempted to portray what has been happening in the Middle East as evidence of a successful US foreign policy, citing the ousting of the Syrians from Lebanon, Egyptian president Mubarak's allowing competition on the presidential ballot, Palestinian elections and limited Saudi local elections (for men only) as signs of a wind of change. Some go so far as to compare these developments with the toppling of the Berlin Wall. But in contrast to these rosy analyses, Lebanon has experienced a string of bombings, and Islamist candidates won the elections in Saudi Arabia. The optimists and neo-conservatives encouraging a democratic crusade in the Middle East also fail to mention the mounting Shiite insurgency in Yemen and PKK's return to arms in Turkey; both of these developments followed Operation Iraqi Freedom. When claiming a casual link between the invasion of Iraq and democratic currents one can just as well link all negative events to Bush and Blair's assertiveness. The comparison with glasnost and the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe is also interesting. Though such sweeping generalizations are usually ridden with fallacies, again there are similarities. Gorbachev's perestroika not only brought democracy to Eastern Europe, but also generated brutal conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, regions which have more in common with the Middle East than does Eastern Europe.<br />In view of these sobering facts, what should be the essential elements of a new policy toward Iraq? First, the perception of the coalition forces as occupants in that country is a clear indication that the US, Britain and other coalition members should immediately set a reasonably early date for withdrawal and thereafter limit their role in Iraq to diplomacy and development aid. Given the inadequacy of Iraq's own security forces, however, external military assistance is clearly needed. A new force must be put together, and it must be unambiguously identifiable as separate from the current occupants. With a mandate from the UN Security Council, a force led by Jordan, Morocco or Egypt could be assembled under the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League. However, as the countries of the Middle East have proven largely incapable of concerted diplomatic action, the US should remain involved, though with a low profile. Pakistan and Bangladesh, with their extensive experience in peacekeeping, could augment the military force, while the EU could provide military advisers and staff officers, and perhaps special-operations units, from countries opposed to the war such as France, Germany and Sweden. Also, Canada may play a constructive role. For practical purposes the new force would probably need US logistical support, in airlifts for example. Positive steps toward multilateralization have already been taken. NATO is training Iraqi security forces (though not on Iraqi soil), and the EU has established its rule-of-law mission in Iraq, EUJUST LEX as well as ECHO, the European Commission Humanitarian Office’s programmes in Iraq.<br />The transition to the new force should be part of an integrated approach to securing peace in Iraq. For instance, further resources are needed for supplying electricity, clean water and constructing sewage systems, and the "hearts and minds" policy should be tempered with an amnesty for resistance fighters not guilty of war crimes ( i.e. striking at civilian targets), as proposed by President Jalal Talabani when sworn in on 7 April. Similarly, the US and Britain must set an example in dealing with their own offenders. The demotion of Brigadier General Karpinski, formerly in charge of Abu Ghraib, is a good start, but the US must not stop there if it is to have any hope of regaining respect worldwide.<br />Importantly, a real peace process cannot exclude Iran, which intends to play an active role in post-Saddam Iraq. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, recently corroborated by Time magazine, Iran's influence in Iraq is considerable, especially in the Shiite community, but also in the Kurdish north. Iran is justified in intervening as long as the Mujaheedin Khalq Organization is fighting the regime in Teheran from bases in Iraq. This group should be demobilized, and Teheran should receive guarantees that no similar group be allowed to operate from Iraqi territory.<br />Turkey has similar concerns with the PKK, which is based in northern Iraq, and the Turkish army will continue their occasional incursions into Iraq as long as this situation persists. Surely, the Kurds will demand a quid pro quo for demobilizing PKK, but ignoring this situation is not an option -- Iraq will never be stable as long as it keeps hosting rebel groups from its neighbors. It may seem naive to argue that US should withdraw from Iraq and limit itself to behind-the-scenes diplomacy while relying on Middle Eastern countries and other actors to provide security. But together with regional discord, US overzealousness is perhaps the principal cause of the instability in Iraq and neighboring countries. Peace in Iraq is not possible unless both these factors are addressed.Henryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13095124973436438208noreply@blogger.com0